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F»RE;F^rf=sCE:
The present day war between Iraq and Iran is not new.
This war, which began on September 22, 1980, has its roots in
both the immediate and remote past. The Iraqi-Iranian
conflict is as old as the history of Mesopotamia. The saying
that the world is ruled by the dead more than the living is
true. It applies to both Iraq and Iran. This fact is the
driving power behind the hatred.
In fact, the Iraq—Iran dispute is very old and its roots
go back to the old history of Babylon, Nineveti and the
Persian Empire.
There were times when the Persians dominated Iraq. Also,
the Arabs dominated Persia after the rise of Islam in the
seventh century. The border problem between Iraq and Persia
became an issue when they reached their separate identities.
After that, the Arab countries fell under the Ottoman
Empire’s domination and Iraq was one of these countries.
There were rivalries and continuing conflicts between
Persians and Ottomans. Iraq was a battleground between the
two empires for a long time.
VI 1
The first chapter of this study deals briefly with the
hirtorical background of the Iraq—Iran conflict, especially
the modern history of this conflict. This study begins with
the conflict’s modern history in the sixteenth century, which
began with Persians—Ottomans rivalries and wars over Iraqi
soi 1.
In fact, the border disputes, which existed between the
Ottoman Empire and the Persian Empire, continued after the
creation of the independent state of Iraq.
The sovereignty over the Shatt a 1—Arab waterway tias been
the central and continuous issue of the conflict for a long
time. Since the sixteenth century, many treaties have been
signed to settle the conflict over the Shatt al—Arab. The
last agreement which failed to solve the territorial disputes
was the Algeria Agreement. This agreement was signed on
March 6, 1975 by the President of Iraq and the Shah of Iran.
Chapter two of this study searches deeply into the economic,
strategic and historically important issue of the Shatt
al—Arab. In addition, through chapter two, I will discuss
the impact of the Kurdish rebellion in northern Iraq on the
conflict between both countries. Also, it examines their
relationship through Iran’s policy based on military aid to
the Kurdish rebellion from the Shah’s era untill now.
vi i i
The Shatt al-Arab dispute is not the only problem between
Iraq and Iran. There are other disputes as well, the dispute*
over the land frontier, Arabistan, and rivalry between both
countries for superiority in the Gulf region. All of these
subjects are covered in the third chapter of this study.
Moreover, chapter three examines and explains the Israeli
role in the conflict, which increased hostilities between
both sides.
The subject of the final chapter deals with the issue of
the war. It covers the ideological clashes between the
Ba’ath Party in Iraq and the Islamic Republicans in Iran, and
the course of the war of 1980.
I have relied upon Iraqi as well as Iranian data and




I InITROIDLJCT I OM
The Iraq-Iran War has a long history of conflict that
goes back for centuries. The current war has continued for
more than five years. It has brought death and suffering to
hundreds of thousands of people in both countries. It has
disrupted the economies of both sides. In addition, this war
has increased international tensions by precipitating new
alliances and rearrangement of forces in the already troubled
Middle East.
There are many misconceptions as to the cause of the
present day war. Western authors and professors, particularly
the Americans, believe falsely, that the Iraq-Iran War is a
religious war. This study shows that the basic conflict
between Iraq and Iran is over the sovereignty over Shatt
al—Arab Waterway, Iraqi borderlands and the Arabistan
province, which was dominated by Iran in the past. The nature
of the relations between Iraq and Iran, especially after the
Iraqi Nationalist Revolution of the 14th of July, 1958, the
rise of the Arab Ba’ath Socialist Party in Iraq (1968) and
its national struggle with Iran for the lands and water led
both countries to the present war. Between 1969 and 1975 the
Iraqi-Iranian conflict focused on three major issues: 1) the
continuous Shatt al—Arab boundary dispute; 2) Iran’s support
2
for the Kurdish rebellion in Iraq; and 3) rivalry over the
strategic Gulf region.
The continuous tension between the two countries
increased and became more inflamed during the reign of the
Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. Both countries’ quest
for influence in the Gulf, coupled with the clash in their
perceived national interests in the region, have been one of
the major sources of conflict in Iraqi-Iranian relations.
The Shah’s ambitions in the Arab Gulf and his special
relationship with Israel added new dimensions to the ongoing
disputes between both countries. The Iraqi-Iranian
confrontation in the Gulf centered around three major issues;
1) Iran’s attempts to be the only dominating power in the
region; 2) Iranian claims to Bahrain; and 3) Iranian
occupation of the three Arab Gulf Islands: Abu Musa, Greater
and Smaller Tunbs.
The Algeria Agreement of 1975, which was signed by the
President of Iraq and the Shah of Iran, was to be a peaceful
ending to the long dispute over the Shatt al—Arab River. Many
authors considered that the Algeria Agreement resolved the
Shatt al—Arab dispute between both countries. It was seen as
a good way to settle the conflict in the region. In my
analysis of the information available, the opposite was the
case. The Algeria Agreement of 1975 was one of the
3
contributing factors that led both countries to the war.
Many Western authors believe that Iran’s policy under
Ayatollah Khomeini toward Iraq and the small Arab Gulf states
is different from the Shah’s policy. My analysis will show
that the Shah’s policy and Khomeini’s policy in the region
are actually one and the same, that only different means were
used to achieve the same end result.
The rise to power of the Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran led
to a head-on collision with the secular, nationalist regime
in Iraq. The ideological clashes between both regimes
adversely affected relations between the two countries and
eventually precipitated the outbreak of the war on September
22, 1980.
Due to the complexity of the subject and the paucity of
published research on Iraqi—Iranian relations, I have relied
upon intreviews conducted with Iraqi and Iranian officials by
various publications and periodicals concerning relations
between the two countries, as well as on speeches and
declarations by Iraqi andiranian leaders. I have also relied
upon official documents published by the two countries
regarding their relations. This research has also relied on
Arab and Western periodicals and on secondary sources in both
Arabic and English.
CHAPTER I
ROOTS OF THE CONFLICT; HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
THE ANCIENT ROOTS OF THE CONFLICT;
The present day war between Iraq and Iran is not the
first war between these countries. The history of the region
shows this war is Just another one of the historical
conflicts between Arabs and Persians. We can trace back the
roots of this conflict to 539 E.C. when Babylon fell under
the domination of Cyrus, the King of Achaemenid Iran, who
combined Babylon into the Persian Empire.<1)
The Sassanian Dynasty of Persia ruled Iraq for almost
four centuries, between 224 A.D. and 636 A.D. The most
important occurrence in the history of the two countries was
the battle of "al-Qadissiyah" in 636 A.D. Muslim Arab
warriors burst out of the Arabian Peninsula to conquer Iraq
and destroy the Persian Empire in the battle of
"al—Qadissiyah".(2) The Arab warriors continued to the
Sassanian capital of "al—Madian" <a small town south of
Baghdad now).(3> The Arab’s victory in the battle of
"al—Qadissiyah" in 636 A.D. brought the Sassanian Dynasty of
Persia to an end.<4) In 1258, Mongols invaded Baghdad and
put an end to Abbasid Dynasty.<5)
4
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In fact, the outbreak of uiar betueen Iraq and Iran in
September, 1980 was the result of conflicts that are rooted
in history and evei—present, if at times quiescent.
Due to the lack of data, it is difficult to indicate the
political, economic and other causes of the various struggles
that were mentioned.
THE MODERN ROOTS OF THE CONFLICT;
Another focus of hostility is the Arab—Persian conflict
that dates from the clashes between the Ottoman and Persian
empires. Although their frontiers roughly approximated the
present boundaries of Iraq and Iran, since the sixteenth
century innumerable conferences, surveys, and treaties have
failed to determine a permanent and mutually satisfactory
boundary.
In fact. the Ottoman Empire played the role of the
protector of the Sunnis. On the other hand. the Safawid ■4*
Dynasty, which was the first native Iranian dynasty since the
Sassanian Dynasty, claimed to be the protector of the
Shi’ites.(6)
The Ottomans and Persians valued Iraq as a strategic
asset, because it is an important route to the Arab Gulf and
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it serves as a significant land bridge between East and West.
Moreover, Iraq’s significance is rooted in its rich and
glorious past. Great civilizations, such as the Assyrian,
Babylonian and Sumerian, flourished in ancient Iraq, and the
choice of Baghdad as the capital of the Abbasid Muslim
Dynasty conferred on the city a unique prestige and
distinction which prompted the Ottomans, Persians and other
foreign powers to cast a covetous eye on it.
The intensification of Ottoman—Persian rivalry manifested
itself in the unceasing attempts on the part of both powers
to delineate their frontiers, particularly those in the
southern part of Persia and Iraq.
At this time, neither empire could achieve permanent
military domination over Iraq and they were unable to resolve
their conflict through armed forces. A treaty dated in 1639
at Zuhab was one of the earliest agreements between the two
empires that dealt with frontier demarcation, allocation of
the Kurdish population in northern Iraq, provision for
Persian Shi’ites to perform the pilgrimage to shrines in
Iraq, and seasonal grazing rights.(7)
In fact, Persia’s goals in Iraq were: 1) to increase its
influence in Iraq; 2) to maintain the security of the
Basrah—Baghdad—Khanaqin trade route, through which foreign
7
goods and commodities flouied into Persia; and 3) to gain
unlimited access to the holy Shi’ite shrines in Najaf and
Karbala, particularly since the Safaiuid Dynasty saw itself as
the protector of the Shi’ites in Iraq.(8>
In the early 1900’s a new political situation began to
emerge. The balance of power changed at the beginning of the
ninteenth century when the British imperialist power grew in
the region. The growth of British power changed the nature
of the conflict between the Turks and Persians. To protect
its interest in India, Britain turned the Gulf region into a
British lake and moved its attention to Ottoman Iraq and
Persia- Britain wanted to protect its line of commerce with
India via the Middle East. Also, it wanted to e>;tend its
commercial ojarkets in the region. Therefore, Britain wanted
to have stability in the region. The Ottoman-Persian
conflict and the political autonomy of many unruly tribes in
the frontier zones between both empires posed problems for
the progress of British imperialism in the region. At the
same time, Russia was the only imperialist rival for Britain
in the region. Settling the conflict between the Ottoman and
Persian empires became an important policy for Britain and
Russia in the Middle East. British and Russian policies were
against any additional rival imperialist extension in the
region. Therefore, their common interests in stabilizing the
region pushed them to cooperate in settling the conflict
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between the Turks and Persians. Thus, Britain and Russia
cooperated to intervene in the boundary disputes between
Ottoman Iraq and Persia. Britain and Russia Joined in the
Ottoman—Persian Commission to settle the frontier
conf1ict.(9)
In other words, economic and political interests of
Britain and Russia in the Ottoman and Persian empires and the
Persian intervention in Ottoman Iraq pushed them to intervene
as mediation powers to solve the Persian and Ottoman
disputes. After four years of difficult negotiations, the
commissioners signed the second Treaty of Erzerum on May 31,
1847.(AppendiX I>(10) In fact, this treaty served the
British and Russian imperialist interests by leaving the
settlement of details to the delimitation commission.
Britain and Russia also played the role of
intermediarles.(11)
The Ottoman Empire became very weak and it was called the
Sick Man of Europe. The Explanatory 1Note (Appendix II)
connected to the second Treaty of Erzerum in 1847 showed an
effective limitation to the Persians ambitions in the
southern part of Ottoman Iraq. More than a century later.
the Persian government stated that it did not give i ts
representative at the 1847 negotiations any permission to
sign the government’s approval of the Explanatory Note.(12)
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According to the Second Treaty of Errerum in 1847, the
settlement of regional disputes was not served with
consideration to territorial demands. In fact, this treaty
manifested the general interests of the imperialist powers in
the region. At the end of the nineteenth century, Britain
gained commercial domination and a strategic position in
Ottoman Iraq. Different from Ottoman Iraq, in Persia the
British competed with Russia to expand their influence in the
region. The two imperialist powers contended in a race for
great concessions to utilize Persia’s natural resources.
With Russian influence in the north and Britain’s control
over the Gulf region to the south, Persia used the rivalry
for its own advantage to protect its natural resources. This
situation gave the Persians extra advantages in its boundary
disputes with the Ottoman Empire.<13)
The second Treaty of Erzerum in 1847, in fact, did not
resolve the boundary controversy. The Tehran Protocol of
1911, which was signed by the Ottomans and Persians,
(Appendix III), provided a basis for negotiations and
established a boundary commission.<14) In 1913 a delegation
of British, Russian, Ottoman, and Persian representatives met
and delineated the boundary from the Arab Gulf to Mount
Ararat and redefined navigational rights on the Shatt al-Arab
River in what became known as the Constantinople Protocol of
1(9
1913 and proceedings of the commission on delimitation of *
frontiers of 1914. (Appendix IV) (15)
However, the First World War brought a significant change
to the region. The collapse of Czarist Russia and the rise
of the Socialist Revolution left Britain as the main
imperialist power in the Middle East. (16) In 1917 Iraq fell
under British imperialist domination and became a
semi—independent state under a mandate system on August 23,
1921.(17) The tension between Iraq and Iran continued over
the frontiers.
Sovereignty over the Shaft al—Arab waterway was seen as
one of the most important reasons which caused the present
day war. This issue will be examined in detail in the
following chapter. I will discuss in detail how this issue
has affected the relationship between Iraq and Iran for a
long time.
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CHAPTER II
THE SHATT a1-ARAB CONFLICT
The Shatt al-Arab boundary dispute has been a continual
and major source of conflict between Iraq and Iran.
Compounding the dispute over the demarcation of the
boundaries in the Shatt al-Arab was Iraq’s historical legacy
as a successor state after the fall of the Ottoman Empire.
This involved a superabundance of frontier treaties between
the Ottomans and Persians. Since the Treaty of Zuhab in
1639, the two empires had concluded a series of treaties to
demarcate the ill-defined boundaries on the Shatt al-Arab
River.
The history of Iraqi-Iranian relationship has been
damaged by a perennial tension over the demarcation and
conclusive control of the strategic Shatt al-Arab River.
Iraq, as a successor state, sought to maintain the "status
quo" along the Iraqi-Persian boundaries. Iran on the other
hand, fought to change the "status quo", which it viewed as
inimical to its national interests. These differences of
their common boundaries led each country to view the other




There has been a tendency for the Shatt al—Arab boundary ^
dispute to spill-over into other facets of Iraqi-lranian
relations. An example of the spill-over effects u>as the
Iranian’s intervention into the Kurdish problem in northern
Iraq. The Kurdish minority has historically exploited by
Iran as a vehicle to ueaken central governments in Iraq.
Moreover, the Shatt al-Arab crisis precipitated the start of
a cold war and hostile actions between the two countries,
setting in motion a cycle of action and reaction which
engulfed the two states until the Algeria Agreement of 1975.
T^ie Shatt al— Arab dispute was predetermined by the
physical complexity of the waterway and the proximity of
Iraqi and Iranian interests there. Despite frequent
adjudication over the centuries, it has remained a constant
source of friction.
The focus of this chapter is on the following issues:
1. Economic and strategic importance of the Shatt al-Arab
2. The Second Treaty of Erzerum of 1847
3. The Shatt al-Arab dispute after World War 1
4. The Treaty of 1937
5. The Shatt al-Arab dispute after the Revolution of July
14th, 1958
6. The Kurdish problem and the Shatt al-Arab dispute
7. The Algeria Agreement of March 6th, 1975.
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These issues will be examined in detail to see how the
Shatt al-Arab dispute has seriously affected the relationship
between Iraq and Iran.
ECONOMIC AND STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF THE SHATT al-ARAE RIVER:
The Shatt al—Arab River is made up of a delta in the Arab
Gulf formed by the confluence of the Tirgis and Euphrates
Rivers. It is located 47 miles north of the Port of Basrah.
Its length is approximately 136 miles beginning at the town
of Al—Qurnah and empties into the Arab Gulf on the coast of
Iraq near the port of al-Faw. Also, the Karun River Joins
the Shatt al—Arab at the entrance to the city of Mohammarah
to the South of Basrah. It is sufficiently deep and wide to
provide passage for deep sea vessels. Its width varies from
1/4 mile to 3/4 mile according to the region. The Shatt
al-Arab River forms the common Iraqi-Iranian border for
approximately the last 55 miles of its length to the Gulf.
In fact, the Shatt al—Arab River and its surrounding
lands have strategic and economic value for both Iraq and
Iran. However, it is more important for Iraq because this is
the only opening to the Gulf and open sea. In other words
this river is Iraq’s only life line.(1) The Shatt al-Arab
waterway is referred to by President Saddam Hussein as the
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vital vien of Iraq’s economy.(2)
Iraq’s coastline on the Gulf is only about fifteen
kilometers long. Noting Iraq’s disadvantage in this regard.
Presiden Hussein has said that Iraq "has only limited
outlets" to the sea luhile Iran, in comparison, "has a coast
2,300 kilometers long".(3) Basrah, which before the war
handled many of Iraq’s imports and exports other than oil, is
accessible only through the narrow, vulnerable throat of the
Shatt al—Arab waterway.(4) Therefore, any hostile hand can
cut Iraq’s throat.
S. R. Grummon described the Shatt al—Arab’s strategic
and economic importance for Iraq as follows:
The Shatt and the region around it have strategic
and economic iinportance for both countries, but
particularly for Iraq. The Shatt is Iraq’s
principal maritime window on the world, its "warm
water port", to draw an analogy from Russian
history. Basrah, virtually the only Iraqi
commercial port of any importance... . Major crude
oil export pipelines lie parallel to the river,
often at a close distance, and a major crude tank
farm is situated at al—Faw, on the Gulf near the
mouth of the river.... Basrah will remain Iraq’s
preeminent port and the Shatt will therefore remain
Iraq’s major economic artery for an indefinite
period of time.(5)
As a matter of fact, for Iraq, the importance of the (:»
Shatt al-Arab River is both economic and strategic. For
Iran, the Shatt al-Arab River has greater economic than
strategic importance, Grummon described this as:
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Iran, too, has important economic interest on the
Shatt. For decades its most important port has
been Khorramshahr (Mohammara), which lies at the
confluence of the Shatt and Karun rivers and which
also serves the southern railhead for the
Trans—Iranian railway system. Despite Iran’s long
coastline, geography and transportation economics
will continue to assure a prominent place for
Khorramshahr in Iran’s commercial life.
Physically, it is the port closest to the major
inland population centers. Commercially,
transporting goods up the Gulf by ship and then
loading theni at the Khorramshahr railhead for the
journey inland is still cheaper than off-loading at
a more southerly port.
Although the Shatt has an obvious economic
importance for Iran, the river does not present the
country with the same strategic vulnerablities that
it does Iraq. Iran’s major petroleum export
facilities are not in the immediate area, and Iran
has other usable Persian (Arabian) Gulf ports.(6)
The British Journalist, Claudia Wright, described the
significance of the strategic and economic importance for
Iraq of the Shatt al—Arab River in these words:
For Iraq, the Shatt al—Arab is only one of its
geographic vulnerablities in the area. Another
feature of the map is that, between Fao and Umm
Qasr, Iraq has less than 50 miles of coastline on
the Gulf-most of it unusable for shipping. The
main port, Basrah, is nearly twice that distance
away from the Gulf, up the Shatt al—Arab, and even
in the best of times it has a three-month cargo
bottleneck. Umm Qasr, the Iraqi naval base, lies
on the border with Kuwait, and can only be reached
by sea through a narrow passage between the Iraqi ^
shore and Kuwait islands. The approach to Fao and 4
the entrance to the Shatt estuary is commanded by ,
Iranian artillery and naval posts on and around
Abadan island.
From the Iraqi point of view, hostile hands are
always potentially around the country’s throat.
Like Jordan at the Gulf of Aqaba, Iraq at the
Persian Gulf must share its access to the sea with
a non—Arab state and traditionaly enemy. Iraq is >
also the only member of OPEC (The Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries) whose oil exports ^
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cannot reach the outside world without crossing
foreign territory in the north (Syria, Lebanon and
Turkey), or without coining so close to Iranian
territory in the south that it cannot be said to
enjoy territorial security at all for its principal
means of survival.(7)
Despite the standoff, both states continued to have large
unsatisfied interests in the Shatt al-Arab River. Iraq
believed that its own needs were acute: its usable coastline
is restricted to approximately fifteen kilometers; the Shatt
al—Arab is Iraq’s sole means of egress to the Gulf; the port
city of Basrah is some ninety kilometers from the river’s
mouth; the river must be dredged frequently in order to be
navigable. Moreover, the importance of the waterway and its
surrounding region continued to increase in proportion to the
role of oil in Iraq’s economy. The Iraqi government argued
that Iran’s 2,3C?0~k i lometer coastline made possible numerous
ports, among them Chah Bahar, Bandar Abbas, and Bushire.
Iran countered that it too had vital economic interests in
proximity to the waterway: Kharg Island, Iran’s major oil
terminal and shipping facility, lay only fourty eight
kilometers offshore; Abadan was the site of a major oil
refinery; and Khosrowabad, some twenty five kilometers south
of Abadan on the Shatt al—Arab, contained a naval base.
Concerning Iraq’s position in the Shatt al—Arab region,
•Iraq believes that its most important economic and hence
strategic assets are unprotected because Iraq lacks strategic
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territorial depth".(8) (see map no.7)
THE SECOND TREATY OF ERZERUM OF 1847;
The conflict over the Shaft al—Arab River has a long
history. This river has been a major source of the power
struggle in this region for many centuries. The modern roots
of the Shaft al-Arab issue can be traced back to 1639 when
the Ottomans and Persians signed a peace treaty of Zuhab of
1639. However, this treaty did not mention the border issue
in detail. The Persians claimed that the Shaft al—Arab
established a natural border; the Ottoman’s view was that the
Arab tribes in the areas of both sides of the Shaft al-Arab
composed an ethnic and historical unit which belonged to the
Ottoman Empire. (9) New frontier conflicts eme'^ged around
Muhammarah Ca city in Arabistan which was renamed by Iran to
Khorramshrwhen the Persians controlled the city.
Encouraged by Anglo-Russian mediation, the Ottoman Empire
and Persia concluded the Erzerum Treaty of 1847, which is
regarded as the basis for the delineation of Ottoman-Persian
Joint boundaries on the Shaft al-Arab. The treaty granted
Persia sovereignty over territories lying on the east bank of
the river, while granting the Ottomans full sovereignty over
territories lying on the west bank. Accordingly, the city of
Muhammarah was allocated to Persia, in return for Persia’s
20
relinquishing sovereignty over the city of Sulaimaniyya in
northern Iraq. This territorial arrangement was enshrined in
article 2 of the treaty, which stipulated that:
"The Persian Government abandons all claims to the
city and province of Suleimani, and formally
undertakes not to interfere with or infringe the
sovereign rights of the Ottoman Government over the
said province.
The Ottoman Government formally recognises the
unrestricted sovereignty of the Persian Government
over the city and the port of Muhammara, the island
of Khizer, the anchrage, and the land on the
eastern bank-that is to say, the left bank—of the
Shatt al—Arab, which are in the possession of
tribes recognised as belonging to Persia".(10) (see
map no.2)
The treaty also granted Persia freedom of navigation in the
Shatt ai—Arab waterway, and the Persians pledged not to
interfere in northern Iraq.
According to the Second Treaty of Erzerum, a commission
was to be set up to delineate the Ottoman—Persian boundary.
Negotiations began in 1850, but problems arose over Persia’s
Jurisdiction over Muhammarah. The Ottomans insisted that the
Persians cease to exercise sovereignty over the city until
the commission had reached its final verdict.
Nonetheless, prior to the signing of the treaty, the
Ottoman Empire asked the British and Russian representatives
for their interpretation of certain of its provisions. In
response, the Ottoman government obtained assurances from the ^
British and Russian representatives that the Ottomans’
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relinquishment of Muhammarah and the island of Khizr C Iran
renamed this island Abadan 3 did not imply their
relinquishment of other territories in that area (on the left
bank of the Shatt al-Arab). These assurances were contained
in the Explanatory Note (Appendix II) attached to the Second
Treaty of Erzerum. In effect, this treaty placed control of
the conflict into the hands of the mediating powers,
Particularly Britain . It gave Britain the stability
necessary to consolidate its penetration of Mesopotamia
(Iraq).(11)
Moreover, the Explanatory Note stipulated that Persia was
not entitled to put forward any claims "in regard to the
regions situated on the right bank of the Shatt ai—Arab, or
to the territory on the left bank belonging to Turkey, even
where Persian tribes or parts of such tribes are established
on the said bank or in the said territory".(12) These
assurances, given to the Ottomans, led some historians to
view the entire Shatt al—Arab waterway, with the exception of
areas specified in the Erzerum Treaty, as falling within the
exclusive Jurisdiction of the Ottoman authorities.(13) ^
Although the Persian representative the Explanatory Note, the
Persian government later repudiated it and questioned its
validity and legality.(14)
The Boundary Commission, which was established by the
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Treaty of Erzerum, attempted to achieve a final frontier
settlement. However, the differences over the legal status
of the Explanatory Note aborted the work of the commission
and led to its eventual suspension.(15) On August 1912
however, Persia recognized the validity of the note as a
gesture of "its sincere desire to arrive at a settlement of
frontier question".(16) In addition to the harbour and
anchoring rights laid down in the Erzerum Treaty, Persia’s
goal was to have, with Turkey, Joint control over the Shatt
al-Arab River.<17)
After the Anglo-Russian mediation, the Border Commission
produced the Constantinople Protocol in 1913. According to
article 1 of the protocol, "the forntier shall follow the
course of the Shatt al-Arab as far as the sea, leaving under
Ottoman sovereignty the river and all the islends
therein".(18) (see map no.3) In effect, the Constantinople
Protocol reasserted the Ottoman’s sovereignty over the entire
Shatt al—Arab up to the Persia’s side, with the exception of
certain limitation at Muhammarah and Abadan.(19)
THE SHATT AL-ARAB CONFLICT AFTER THE FIRST WORLD WAR:
The result of the World War I caused complete unique
conditions for the frontier issue along the Shatt al—Arab
River. As a result of the First World War, Iraq fell under
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the British mandate. As a successor state to the Ottoman i
Empire, Iraq inherited the frontier conf1ict.(20) This
coincided with rise of Reza Shah as a powerful modernizing
and centralizing monarch in Iran. After the destruction of
the autonomous Arab Emirate of Arabistan by Reza Shah, "it
became increasingly evident that Iran was unwilling to accept
the contractual agreements on the Shatt al-Arab River".(21)
Moreover, Reza Shah began to demand a revision of the
Persi an—Iraqi boundary. To that end, he withheld recognition
of Iraq until 1929, and relations between the two countries
were marred by a number of differences. Iran claimed that
Britain and Russia together put the Iranian delegation under
their pressure to give up many points of the Iranian national
interests.(22)
Iran also contended that 6(S7. of the water resources
flowing into the Shatt al—Arab originated from Iranian rivers
such as the Karun, the Upper and Lower Zab, the Dialeh and
the Khabur.(23)
Capitalizing on King Faisal’s visit to Iran in April,
1932, and the subsequent visit of Iraq’s Premier Nuri
al—Sa’id to Tehran, the Iranian government pressed for a
revision of the boundary line to fix it in the mid-stream
channel. (24) tension became increasingly evident and clashes 4’^
occurred on the Joint borders.(25) The ensuing deterioration
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of relations between the two countries led Iraq to lodge a
complaint with the League of Nations in November, 1934.(26)
THE TREATY OF 1937:
The League of Nations did not succeed in obtaining any
solution to this dispute. Both Iraq and Iran agreed to
withdraw their case from the League of Nations. Direct
negotiations began between both countries and continued for
two years.(27) Iraq signed a new treaty with Iran on July 4,
1937 (Appendix V)
The 1937 Treaty confirmed the validity of the
Constantinople Protocol of 1913 and the minutes or the
Delimitation ^Commission of 1914 as a basis for the
delimitation of the Iraqi-Tranian frontiers.(28) In return
for Iran’s recognition of the protocol and the outcome of the
commission, Iraq ceded to Iran a four—mile anchorage area in
the Shatt al—Arab.(29) According to this treaty, the border
between Iraq and Iran in the Shatt al—Arab region "should
follow the Thalweg (or the mid—channel of the Shatt al-Arab),
for only four miles opposite the city of Abadan".(see map
no.4). Moreover, in the protocol attached to the Treaty of
1937, Iran gained another concession from Iraq which
stipulated that, if either of the two contractual parties
issued a permit to a warship belonging to a third party in
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the Shatt al-Arab, this permit would be considered as granted ^
by the other party, provided that the other party was
notified immediately.(30) However, the Shatt al-Arab River
“was assigned to Iraqi jurisdiction in its whole
breadth".(31)
In fact, Iran’s territorial gains from the Treaty of 1937
can be attributed to the chaotic domestic situation in Iraq
following the coup d’etat staged by General Bakr Sidky in
November, 1936, which led to the weakening of Iraq’s
negotiating position.(32) Thus the Iraqi government later
accused Iran of having exploited the unstable situation in
Iraq, which resulted in Iran’s extracting concessions in the
Shatt al—Arab at Iraq’s expense. Iraq maintained that, in
return for these concessions, it had gained nothing except a
pledge from Iran to adhere to the 1913 Protocol and the
proceedings of the 1914 Delimitation Commission as the basis
for settling the disputed bounderies.(33)
However, an Iranian-Iraqi Boundary Commission started its
work in the Shatt al—Arab region on December S, 193B. Both
sides of the commission gave different interpretations for
the treaty’s articles. Iran claimed an equal control and
protection of the shipping lanes in the Shatt al-Arab River.
The Iraqi side viewed this claim as an Iranian attempt to use
the treaty to undermine Iraq’s sovereignty over the Shatt
al-Arab.(34) As a result of differences between both sides.
the Iraqi—Iranian conflict over the boundary remained
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unresolved.
In 1955 Iraq, Iran, Turkey and Pakistan Joined with
Britain to form the Baghdad Pact (the Middle East Treaty
Organization). The Baghdad Pact members claimed that they
established this organization "to forestall Soviet
penetration of the region".(35) By Joining the Baghdad Pact
of 1955, Iraq and Iran expected that their frontier conflict
would be settled.
THE SHATT AL-ARAE DISPUTE AFTER THE REVOLUTION OF JULY 14th,
1958:
With the overthrow of the monarchy and the rise of the
republican regime in Iraq in 1958, Iraqi-Iranian relations
underwent a steady deterioration. Symptomatic of this
deterioration were the revival of the unsettled boundary
question and the recurrence of military clashes along the
Joint border.
The Revolution of July 14th, 1958, in Iraq exacerbated
Iran’s fears, not only because of the downfall of the
monarchical system in Iraq, but also because of the danger
that Iraq might ultimately drift towards the revolutionary
camp led by President Nasser of Egypt, who was championing
Pan—Arabism and preaching anti—monarchical and anti-Western
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slogans.(36).
Immediately after the revolution of July 14th, 1958, Iraq
withdrew from the Baghdad Pact. Moreover, the failure of the
royal regime in Iraq and the rise of the nationalist
revolution sent shock waves through the Iranian Royal regime
and the Western bloc. Furthermore, the Shah of Iran was
extremely afraid of the growth of the communist influence
within the new Iraqi Government of General Abdulkarim Kasim,
who was named as the leader of the revolution. The Shah
believed that this might encourage and stimulate the
communists in Iran.(37)
However, Iran resumed its hostile attitude towards Iraq.
It reopened the old boundary disputes with Iraq. On the
other hand, Iraq believed that all problems between both
sides had ended with the Treaty of 1937.(38) In reality, a
propaganda campaign against the new regime in Iraq was
started by the Iranian Government. In an attempt to press
Iran to settle the boundary question. General Kasim, the
Prime Minister of Iraq, threatened to restore to Iraq the
anchorage area which had been ceded to Iran as part of the
1937 Treaty.(39) Iran retorted that it would accept no
principle in fixing the frontier line in the Shatt al-Arab
other than that the Thalweg. (40) Iran’s demand was a major
departure from the tenets of the 1937 Treaty, and
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subsequently rendered it inoperative.
The unsettled boundary dispute continued to fester into
the 1960s, despite meetings between Iraqi and Iranian
representatives in 1966, 1967 and 1968.(41) However, Iraq
experienced five different regimes and three coups d’etat in
less than ten years. When the Ba’ath Party came to power in
Iraq in July, 1968, Iran sent an official delegation in
February, 1969 to discuss the boundary question. The
delegaticon’s proposal for a new treaty to replace the 1937
Treaty was rejected by Iraq. This precipitated the total
collapse of the meeting, which resulted in a further
deterioration in Iraqi-Iranian relations.(42) Two . months
later, Iran officially abrogated the 1937 Treaty, an act
which had unsettling effects on relations between the two
countries. At the same time, Iran sought to increase its
advantage on border adjustments through various aids to the
Kurdish rebellion in the north of Iraq.(43)
THE KURDISH PROBLEM AND THE SHATT a1-ARAB DISPUTE:
Iraq’s delicate ethno-religious structure renders it
vulnerable to outside interference aimed at inciting various
ethnic and religious minorities to rise against the central
government. The Kurdish minority, which is distinct both
ethnically and linguistically, has historically been
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exploited by Iran as a vehicle to weaken central governments.,
in Iraq. The Iranian involvement in the Kurdish question
became the most serious threat to Iraq’s security and its
national interest. In fact, the Kurdish rebellion was
supported by Iran “as a means to settle the Shatt al-Arab
frontier dispute in its favor".(44) The Iranian involvement
in the Kurdish rebellion was looked upon by Iraq as a threat
to its internal unity and to its security. After the success
of the Rev'olution of July 14th, 1958, Iran began to use
Iraqi—Kurdish tribes against the revolutionary regime in
Iraq.
The Kurdish rebels were provided with arms and money by
Iran a?Td were encouraged to cause disruption in northern
Iraq. Also, Iran promised the Kurdish rebels that it "would
seriously consider any appeal from the Iraqi Kurds to unite
with their Iranian brothers*.(45) On July 25, 1953, Teymour
Bakhtiar, the Iranian deputy premier and director of internal
security, stated that if Iraqi Kurds requested union with
Iran, "such a request would be considered with great
interest".(46)
During the 1960s the Kurdish rebellion against the
central government of Iraq became critical issue in Iraq-Iran
relations. As Iraq’s neighbor, Iran has been involved
directly and indirectly since the start of differences
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between the Kurds and the central government. ^
Like other facets of relations between the two countries,
the Kurdish problem was an issue which assumed greater or
lesser significance according to the temperature of overall
relations between Tehran and Baghdad. The wide range of
differences between the two countries, and especially Iraq’s
refusal to revise the 1937 Treaty on the Shatt al—Arab as the
Shah demanded, surely have rankled him the Shah.
Thus, Iran found in the Kurdish rebellion an opportunity
to engage Iraq in domestic turmoil by keeping the bulk of the
Iraqi Army tied down in the north; in this way, Iran hoped to
reduce Iraq’s military and economic capabilities and
ultimately to circumscribe its political options. To
illustrate this point, it was reported that between 1961 and
1966 three of Iraq’s five army divisions and a substantial
portion of its air force were engaged in fighting the Kurdish
rebels.(47)
In early January, 1966 there were reports of an
agreements between Iranian Premier Amir Abbas Huveyda and -
Mulla Mustafa al-Barzani, who was the leader of the Kurdish
rebels, for supplying the Kurds with arms and advisors.
Other reports indicated that Iran also acted as a conduit of
arms shipped to the rebels from Israel. Moreover, Iran
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allowed the Kurds to use Iranian territory to attack the,,,
Iraqi Army. Generally speaking, Iran’s attitude was hostile
to Iraq.(48)
The rise of the Arab Ba’ath Socialist Party to power in
1968 ended the period of political instability in Iraq.
However, the Kurdish rebellion in the north was inherited by
the new Ea’ath Government. The Ba’ath’s determination to
establish a strong government caused more trouble between
Iraq and Iran.(49) The Ea’ath Government attempted to put an
end to the Kurdish rebellion through direct negotiation with
the Kurds. These attempts were resisted by Iran through
substantial increases in military aid to the rebel
forces.(b©) The Ba’ath Government withstood this with a
military campaign against the Kurdish rebels- Thus, Iraq
entered into a situation similar to the civil war.
After Iran’s abrogation of the 1937 Treaty in 1969,
relations between both countries became worse and a war of
propaganda was started by both sides. Iran claimed that
large numbers of Iranians, who were living in Iraq, were
mistreated by Iraqi authorities. Iraq denied this and
declared that large numbers were deported out of Iraq.(51)
Furthermore, Iraq allowed some of the Iranian opposition
leaders to use Iraq as a base against the Shah’s regime.
Some of the above referenced opposition leaders were General
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Teymour Bakhtiar, the former chief of secret police in Iran,
and the Ayatollah Khomeini himself.(52)
However, the war between the Kurdish rebels, backed by
Iranian aid, and the Iraqi Army in northern Iraq was a
serious problem for the Iraqi Government. The Iraqi
Government believed that there were two ways to solve the
Kurdish problem; either it "could give way to the Kurdish
rebels or it could give in to Iran".(53) The Iraqi
Government chose the first way and signed the March 11, 1970
Manifesto with the leader of the rebels. Indeed, Iranian aid
for the rebels increased after the signing of the March
Manifesto. Iran took advantage of the differences that arose
between the Iraqi Government and the leadership of the
Kurdish rebellion. However, the war between the Iraqi Army
and the rebels was inflamed again by massive Iranian
involvement in the Kurdish question. The rebels’ leadership
believed that only Iran’s support could force the Iraqi
Government to agree with its demands.(54)
The Shah of Iran asked President Nixon and his Secretary
of State Dr. Kissinger to Join him in supporting the Kurdish
rebels. The Ba’ath Government viewd the Shah’s aid to the
rebels as a hostile alliance among Iran, the U.S. and
Israel.(55) According to Al-Ahad Magazine, the first U.S.
aid to the Kurdish rebels had occurred in August, 1969.
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General Anthony Devery Hunter, an American officer working
with the CENTO, met al-Barzani in his headquarter in northern
Iraq and signed a secret agreement. In accordance with this
agreement, the U.S. gave $14 million to Mustafa
al-Barzani.(56)
Superpower involvement further propelled the conflict
between Iraq and Iran onto a higher plateau of intransigence.
Pressed beyond its capacity by its rivalry with Iran, by the
need to establish its legitimacy among disparate groups, and
by the anticipated nationalization of Iraq’s oil industry,
the Ea’ath Government sent a delegation to Moscow in July,
1970 to seek weapons. In April, . 1972 Iraq signed a
fifteen-year treaty of friendship and co-operation with the
Soviet Union. Henry Kissinger visited Tehran at the end of
the following month and discussed the Shah^s future
assistance to the Kurdish rebels.(57)
In fact, the Kurdish rebellion was used as a Trojan Horse
by the Shah of Iran to force the Iraqi Government to accept
the "Thalweg" or median line as a border line between the two
countries in the Shatt al—Arab region. A report was made by
congressional investigators about, the U.S. involvement in the
Kurdish rebellion in northern Iraq. This report was called
the Pike House Committee Report, which included a report made
by the CIA chief—of—station in Tehran in 1972. This report
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stated:
"The CIA had early information which suggested that
our ally (the Shah) would abandone the (Kurds) the
minute he came to an agreement with his enemy over
the border dispute".(58)
In short, the Kurdish episode showed that the convergence
of Iranian, American and Israeli interests in weakening the
Iraqi Government led them to use the Kurds as a pawn in the
Iraqi-Iranian dispute. Once the Kurds had outlived their
usefulness, the Iranians abandoned and sacrified them. This
fact was realized belatedly by al-Barzani when he complained
bitterly that “we are bitter, because we were broken down not
by our enemies but by our friends".(59)
THE ALGERIA AGREEMENT OF 1975;
The Algeria Agreement of March 6th, 1975, was a watershed
and marked a significant turning-point in Iraqi-Iranian
relations. One of the major factors behind this agreement
was the conviction of both Iraq and Iran that a full-scale
war must be avoided at all costs.
While the frontier clashes between Iraqi and Iranian
troops reoccurred from 1971 to 1974, the Iraqi Army was
entangled in destructive war with the Kurdish rebels, who
were backed by Iran. In December 1974, and January 1975, the
fighting increased when the Iraqi Army attempted to push the
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Kurdish rebel forces from the strip they still controlled
near the border with Iran. Iraq’s resumption of the war
against the Kurdish rebels and its determination to suppress
the rebellion were matched by a deeper Iranian involvement in
the Kurdish issue and wider clashes along the Iraqi—Iranian
border.
Iran’s increased support for the Kurdish rebels was
evident when the Iranians used sophisticated surface-to-air
Hawk missiles against Iraqi planes flying within Iraqi
airspace in northern Iraq. Two Iraqi warplanes were shot
down inside Iraqi territory on December 14 and 15, 1974.(60)
The 130mm guns were used by Iranian forces to shel 1 the
northern Iraq border towns. especially the town of Qalat
Dizah. In fact, the Shah’s intervention discouraged Iraqi
troops from destroying the Kurdish rebel forces and allowed
them to attack major northern Iraqi cities, especially the
city of Irbil, by heavy arti1lery.(see map no.5)
In January, 1975 Iran increased its aid to the Kurds by
positioning two regiments of uniformed troops inside the
Iraqi border. Iranian combat units armed with 175mm
artillery and Hawk missiles began to provide cover for the
Kurdish rebels, a development which subsequently led to
direct military engagements between Iranian troops and the
Iraqi Army.(61)
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In fact, the Kurdish insurgency had been a financial and
political drain, inhibiting flexibility in both domestic and
foreign affairs. Until an agreement could be reached, the
Ba’ath Government would continue to be distracted from its
program of domestic development, which was linked to the
long-term stability of the Ba’ath Party in Iraq.
As a matter of fact, the war in northern Iraq caused
thousands of casualties and cost over' $2.5 million daily. (62)
Moreover, the Iraqi Army was hardly in a position to
withstand Iranian pressures. Iraqi military and economic
abilities were exhausted by the Kurdish rebellion,
particulariy in the face of the Shah’s military aid to the
rebels and the continuous clashes on the border.(63>
In addition to the above mentioned situation, the most
cogent reason propelling the settlement with Iran was that by
mid—1975 the Soviet Union had so curtailed its arms shipments
that Iraq’s military stores were being rapidly depleted.
President Hussein stated in 1980 that the Algeria initiative
had come at a time when "there were only three heavy missiles
left in the air force and very few artillery shells".(64)
This period, characterized by the slowing of Soviet aid and
by Iranian and American support of the Kurdish rebels, had a






heavy political or military dependence on a
reduced Iraq’s maneuverabi1ity and jeopardized the
the state. The Algeria Agreement of 1975 thus
raq with diverse and sorely needed policy options.
As a matter of fact, the possibility of a large-scale
Iraqi—Iranian war was forestalled when Algerian mediation
efforts succeeded in achieving a significant diplomatic
breakthrough on March 6, 1975, which ended the Shah’s aid to
the Kurds, resulting in the collapse of the Kurdish
rebellion. President Boumedienne of Algeria played a crucial
role during the OPEC’s meeting at Algeria in effecting a
reconciliation between the Shah of Iran and the Iraqi
President, An agreement designed to reach a final settlement
of all problenvs between Iraq and Iran was concluded on March
6, 1975 (Appendix VI).
The Algeria Agreement provided for the following:
1. Definite demarcation of their land frontiers
on the basis of the Constantinople Protocol of 1913
and minutes of the Frontier Demarcation Commission
of 1914.
2. Demarcation of river frontier according to
the Thalweg line, i.e. the median line in
mid-channel.
3. The re-establishment of mutual security and
confidence along their joint border and an
undertaking to conduct strict and effective control
along the joint borders to put a final end to all
subvesive infiltration from either side.
4. The two parties also agreed on considering
the aforementioned arrangements as indivisible
elements for a comprehensive settlement and
consequently the violation of any of the provisions
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will naturally contradict the spirit of the Algeria
Agreement; the two parties will remain in constant
contact with President Houari Boumedienne who will,
when necessary, offer Algeria’s brotherly
assistance for the implementation of these
decisions.(65)
In accordance with this treaty, Iran would stop its aid
to the Kurdish rebels. Iraq agreed to stop the Cold War and
any interference in each others internal affairs. The Iraqi'
lands, which were occupied by Iran in the past, were to be
returned to Iraq. Also, Iraq agreed that the border line
between the two countries in the Shatt al-Arab region should
follow the Thalweg or the mid-channel of the river.(66) (see
Map no.6)
On June 13, 1975, representatives of the two countries
signed an additional agreement, based on the Algeria
Communique, known as the Treaty of International Boundaries
and Good Neighborliness (Appendix VII). This treaty
contained three protocols and annexes. It was designed to
settle dispute over the land and riverine boundaries,
territorial waters, and internal security issues. The basic
agreement involved one major exchange. In return for . Iraq’s
acceptance of the Thalweg as the southern boundry with Iran
rather than the eastern bank of the Shatt al—Arab River, each
country agreed to the principle of noninterference in the
internal affairs of the other country. It was an integral
agreement: violation of one part of the treaty invalidated
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it entirely. This meant, in this instance, that Iran utould
cease to aid the Kurdish rebels in northern Iraq. In
accordance uiith this treaty, Iran was to return Iraqi land in
the middle sector, which Iran had not done while the Thalweg
line was applied to the Shatt al-Arab River.(67)
Iraq has attributed its territorial concessions to the
Shah in March, 1975 to the failure of the Arab states to
support Iraq during the Iraqi-Iranian military confrontation,
and to the failure of the Soviet Union to honour its military
commitments to Iraq. Although Iraq made territorial
concessions to Iran in the Shatt al—Arab, Iraq gained some
portions of territory on the land boundaries with Iran, in
accorda?ice with the 1913 Constantinople Protocc 1. (68)
Moreover, Iraq, which was already disturbed at Iran’s massive
military build-up in the Gulf, saw the Algeria Agreement as
an important vehicle for a reduction of the growing arms race
in the Gulf region.(69)
Regardless of the fact that the Algeria Agreement was
necessary to Iraq’s security and unity, in the long term Iran
attained more. Edith and E. Francis Penrose stated this fact
and said:
For the Shah it opened a prospect of strengthening
the Iranian hold on the Gulf and safeguarding the
single large-scale outlet for Iranian oil
exports.(70)
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In fact, Iran gained immediate advantage ufhen the Algeria
Agreement of 1975 became effective. Iran became a partner in
the sovereignty over the greater part of the Shatt al-Arab
River, based on the rule of the Thalweg line. It is very
clear that Iraq’s difficult position in the Kurdish area was
the most important reason for Iraq to sign the Algeria
Agreement. In his press coference, the Iraqi Defence
Minister stated this fact as follows;
We would not have agreed to the Algeria Agreement
if we had had the choice. We accepted the
agreement because local Arab and international
factors forced us to accept the de facto situation,
which was at the time a step toward a better stage,
to a position beyond the 1975 agreement on ttie land
borders and the Shatt al—Arab.(71)
In spite of the Shah’s withdrawal of his support for the
Kurdish rebellion, Iran’s intervention in the Kurdish problem
in Iraq was not over. Jawad stated his analysis of this
fact, after referring to the Iraqi policy concerning the
Algeria Agreement of 1975, he continued:
This policy was successful in the sense that Iran
withdrew support from the Kurds after the Algeria
Agreement in 1975, and the Kurdish revolt was
crushed.
However, this did not mean that Iranian involvement
in or exploitation of the Kurdish question was
over. The rapprochement did not put an end to all
the disputes between the two countries, and the
Kurdish discontent with the Iraqi government could
always be used to Iran’s advantage.(72)
As a result of the above mentioned case, Iraq declared
that the new regime in Iran (Ayatollah Khomeini regime).
A1
violated the internal security protocol attached to the
Algeria Agreement. The Iraqi Defence Minister declared in
his press conference as follows:
Two months after the new regime came to power, the
Iranian authorities instigated agent Barzani and
his sons—who fought the Iraqi authorities for seven
years to disrupt internal security and whose case
was covered by the Algeria Agreement in its third
protocol on internal security-and began supplying
these groups with weapons, providing them financial
assistance and training them on its
territories.(73)
In summary, the Shatt al—Arab River is unique in the
Middle East region. No other border has a record so long and
so emotional. The Shatt al—Arab dispute is serious enough to
induce either party to go to war. The legacy of centu>"ies,
the vital interest, and the national pride involved all
ensure its importance. In accordance with the Second Treaty
of Erzerum of 1847, the Constantinople Protocols of 1913 &
1914 and the Treaty of 1937, the Shatt al—Arab is not an
international river. It is a national river under Iraq’s
sovereignty. Iraq expressed its sovereignty over the Shatt
al-Arab River except for two small positions opposite Abadan
and Mohammarah.
It was emphasized that no progress has been made on the
resolution of the differences between the two countries that
revolve around their mutual frontier in the Shatt al-Arab
area. Many mediation efforts failed to put an end to the
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Iraq-Iran dispute over the Shatt al-Arab. The failure of
these mediation efforts attests to: 1) the internal technical
and legal complexity of the Shatt al—Arab boundary dispute;
and 2) the difficulty of isolating the Shatt al-Arab issue
from the intricate uieb of Iraqi - Iran i an relations and the
impossibility of addressing the issue in isolation from other
disputed questions.
Another complicating factor which militated against a
settlement of the Shatt al-Arab boundary was Iran’s support
for the Kurdish rebellion in northern Iraq.
The escalation of tension and clashes along the borders
led Iv'aq increasingly to polarize the Iraqi-Iranian conflict
into an Arab-Iranian one. The prospect of a full-fledged war
between the two countries was only averted when they signed
the Algeria Agreement in March, 1975. This ended the Shah’s
aid to the Kurds.
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CHAPTER III
OTHER MAJOR AREAS OF THE CONFLICT
The focus of this chapter is on the following:
Land Frontier Dispute
Arabistan
Rivalry Over the Arabian Gulf
Iran’s Special Relationship with Israel
LAND FRONTIER DISPUTE:
Iraq’s present boundaries do not* correspond to the entire
geographic unit that is primarily defined by the
Tigris-Euphrates river systems, one—quarter of which lies
outside Iraq. The half millennium during which the present
state of Iraq gradually evolved was a history of numerous
negotiations, memoranda, mapmaking, lost records,
procrastination, contradictory evidence, and little accord.
Iraq inherited 1,472 kilometers of old Ottoman-Persian
frontier, which extended some 1,888 kilometers from the Gulf
to Mount Ararat. Approximately 700 of the 1,472 kilometers
pass through the Kurdish area in the north.(1) The
complicated negotiations that defined this Ottoman—Persian
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frontier (uere clouded by intrigue, the extent of which may
only be surmised.
The earliest surviving document relative to the boundary
settlement is dated at Zuhab in 1639, but uias itself preceded
by negotiations known to have occurred about one hundred
years previously. The Zuhab Treaty was followed by numerous
attempts at further adjustments, most important in 1746
(Treaty of Kurdar. >, 1823 and 1847 (Erzerum), 1911 (Tehran),
and 1913 (Constantinople). All of these agreements were
accompanied by the efforts of numerous comn'iss ions and
cartographers, and interspersed with border strikes and
general unrest.(2)
In fact, the frontier problem has been reconsidered twice
since 1914. First, between the new Turkish Republic and
Persia, and second, between Persia and the new Kingdom of
Iraq.(3) However, in 1913-1914 when the Iraqi-Iranian
frontiers were fixed, it was assumed that no dispute should
arise between the two countries on the border question.
Despite that, and shortly after Iraq gained its independence
in 1932, Iran committed a number of violations on Iraqi
territory. Iran, also declared its non-adherence to the
border agreements between the two states. Concerning the
land frontier, Iran denied the validity of the Second Treaty
of Erzerum of 1847 and the Protocol of Constantinople of
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1913, as well as the minutes of the Border Demarcation
Committee of 1913-1914.(4)
Concerning the land frontier problem, Iraq requested the
Council of the League of Nations to deal with this problem.
On January 14, 1935, Nouri al-Said, the Iraqi Foreign Affairs
Minister, at that time, presented Iraq’s case and stated
that:
the difficulties stemmed from Persian interference
with navigation on the Shatt al—Arab, establishment
of police posts and patrols on Iraqi territory,
unlawful claims to a small strip of territory
called Sarkoshk, and the damming of the Gunjan Cham
River".(5)
On the other hand, the Iranian Foreign Minister rejected the
Treaty of Erzerum of 1847 and the Protocol of 1913.
Although geographically confined, the central sector of
the Iraq—Iran border issue becamie inextricably linked with
the Shatt al—Arab and Kurdish issues. The contested region
is some 210 kilometers long, bounded by Khanaqin and
Qasr—e-Shirin in the north and Eadra and Mahran in the
Middle, varying in width from 3 to 16 kilometers. Sporadic
shooting incidents occurred in April 1972 and again from
December, 1973 to February, 1974. After one confrontation in
which some eighty-one Iranians and twenty—four Iraqis
sustained injuries, half of them resulting in death, Iraq
appealed to the UN Security Council, which arranged a
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ceasefire on March 17, 1974.(6) After visiting both
countries, a UN delimitation commission stated in its report
accordingly;
The 1914 border line tracing of the Khanaqin-
Badra/Qasr-e--Shirin-Mahran sector seems to favour
Iraq’s interpretation, although again not in every
respect.
In view of these observations, it would seem
important to delimit and demarcate the border line.
We were assured by both sides that neither, in
principle, had territorial claims along the land
frontier; both governments, in fact, indicated that
they would stand by the findings of a new Joint
delimitation commission, which could also settle at
the same time the question of the other. It would
appear that this question should be given priority
in the conversations on bilateral issues.(7) (see
Maps no.8 & 9>
In accordance with the Algeria Agreement of 1975, the
areas of "Zain Alqaws" and "Saif Sa’ad" “were to be returned
to Iraq, because they were Iraqi lands that had been forcibly
annexed by Iran".(8) However, Iraq waited tor
its land areas that were mentioned above,
required land surveys and the establishment of





the Shah".(9) The Iraqi Government realised the difficulties
and problems that overwhelmed the new regime of Iran,
therefore, it did not immediately demand the Iraqi lands.
The Khomeini regime refused to return the Iraqi lands in
accordance with the Algeria Agreement of 1975.(10) The first
president of the new regime in Iran agreed that the former
Shah of Iran did not honor the Algeria Agreement. However,
he refused to negotiate the border dispute and claimed that;
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"betuieen Moslein states there is no frontier so the problem
does not lie there".(11) He also said that "the dispute over
borders among Islamic countries is trivial".(12)
In conclusion, the land frontier dispute, at this point
in time is still unsettled. The Iranian refusal was one of
the major issues that led to the present war. ■>
ARABISTAN;
One of the principle areas of conflict between Iraq and
Iran is the Arab territory of Arabistan. This area is known
in Arabic as "Ahwas", and it is located southeast of Iraq.
Arabistan’s west boundary reaches Iraq’s territory of Missan
and Basrah including the Shatt al—Arab River. On the north
and east of Arabistan, the chain of Zagros mountains is a
natural boundary, which separates it from Iran. Arabistan’s
southern boundary is the Arab Gulf.(13) (see Map no.10)
Arabistan’s population is approximately three and one
half million, comprised of Arabic tribes, which came in waves
from the Arabian Peninsula before and after the rising of
Islam. In fact, the presence of the Arab tribes in this
region is hence multi—secular and dates back well before
Jesus Christ.(14) After the Arabic Tribe of Eani Tamim,
which came to look for water, other Arabic tribes settled in
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Arabistan before and after the emergence of Islam. Maxime
Rodinson described the supremacy of the nomadic Arab tribes
over the Arabistan region and said:
The Arab penetration is ancient. It certainly must
have begun before Islam, notably when the Arab
tribes were occupying a great part of Mesopotamia
... in the 6th century B.C.(15)
The surface area of Arabistan is approximately 71,430 sq.
miles or 263 miles long and 238 miles wide. Arabistan, is
mainly inhabited by Arabs, and the Arabic culture and custom
is dominant. Most of the historians who specialized in
ancient history identify with Arabistan’s Arabic
character.(16)
In fact, the eastern bank of the Shatt al—Arab River and
the province of Arabistan have been purely Arab areas since
ancient times. The population has been overwhelmingly Arab,
and its language is Arabic. The province of Arabistan has
been ruled by Arab dynasties, such as Mousha’shi’ins, the
Bani Ka’ab, and finally the Emirate of Muhammarah.(see Map
no.11)
The intractable attempts to conquer the province of
Arabistan by either the Persians or Ottomans, and its
strategic location vis-a—vis Iraq and Gulf commerce was
highlighted by the rise of the Ka’ab tribe in the eighteenth
century. Between 1727 and 1763 the Persians as well as the
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Ottomans launched unsuccessful campaigns to dominate the
Bani—Ka’ab tribe. The Arabistan’s effective independence was
ended by the Ottomans with British assistance in 1763.(17)
When the oil was discovered in the Arabistan region, Britain
recognized the autonomy of Muhammarah in 1902 and signed an
agreement of military assistance with Sheikh Kaza’al, the
Sheikh of Muhammarah, in 1905.(18) The British promised the
Sheikh of Muhammarah military assistance against Persia in
exchange for a treaty with the Anglo-Persian Oil Company.
Since the col lapse of the Ottoman Empire, the all iance
between Britain and Reza Khan, the Shah of Iran, was largely
exercised vis—a—vis the Arabistan province. The oil, which
was discovered in Arabistan, made this province a very
strategic area to the British and a most valuable possession
for Iran. Therefore, Britain withdrew its support of
Arabistan’s autonomy.(19)
Muhammarah’s autonomy came to an end in 1925, when Reza
Shah destroyed the power of Sheikh Khaza’al of Arabistan.
Britain’s failure to resist Reza Shah’s destruction of
Arabistan autonomy is attributed to the British Government’s
desire for a highly centralized government in Iran to serve
and further British interests.(20) Some historians argue
that Reza Shah’s destruction of Arabistan emboldened him to
escalate his demands for control of the Shatt al-Arab
57
River. (21) Arabistan’s name u»as changed by the Shah to
Khuzistan in 1925.(22)
After Iraq’s independence, her relationship ujith Iran
remained tense over Arabistan. Taiufiq al—Suwaidi, the first
Iraqi ambassador in Iran, identified the issue of Arabistan
with the Iraqi-Iranian relationship during 1931-1934, and he
stated:
There were other issues which were no less
problematic. The conditions of the Arabs in
Khuzistan (Arabistan) caused complaints and
communications between the two governments. The
Iranian government believed that the Arabs of
Khuzistan were encouraged by the Iraqi govermnent
to rebel. At the same time, the Iraqi government
believ'ed that a harsh oppression was exercised by
Iran against the Arabs of Khuzistan. This policy .
resulted in a number of uprisings which forced tfiS
Arabs of Arabistan to seek refuge in Iraq. The
Iraqi government between the years 1932-1934
thought of asking Iran to allow those people (of
Arabistan) to move into Iraq if they wished, where
they would be given land in Iraq to utilize and
would be able to enjoy their language and
traditions. This appeared to be impossible for no
member of the Iranian government was willing to
even broach the topic with the Shah.(23)
However, the relationship between Iraq and Iran became
more inflamed since the emergence of the Arab Socialist
regime in Iraq and the growing Arab nationalist movement in
Arabistan. The population of Arabistan was considered by the
Arab Ea’ath Socialist Government in Iraq as part of the Arab
nation. In fact, the province of Arabistan contains almost
all of Iran’s oil.(24) Several military bases and barracks
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were built in the province of Arabistan. However, the Arab*,
people of the region never stopped claiming their right to
liberty. They demanded autonomy, "official recognition of
the use of the Arabic Language along with the Persian
Language, a greater place for local Arabs in government, and
economic programs for the Arabs, many of whom live in
exceptionally depressed conditions. Though many Arabs work
in the oil industry, agribusiness, and elsewhere, most hold
lower—paying Jobs than non-Arabs".(25) In fact, the Arab
nationalist movement was effectively suppressed by the Shahs
of Iran, especially the former Shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.
Therefore, —as N. R. Keddie wrote— "the Arab Nationalist
Movement has been encouraged by Arabs outside Iran,
especially by Iraqis".(26> Iraq showed itself to be one of
the Arab countries that was most attentive to the cause of
the province of Arabistan, due to its geographical and
historical ties with this province.
Although Iraq had made vague claims to Arabistan in the
past, it had done so only spasmodi ca 1 ly and even
half-heartedly. After Iran’s abrogation of the 1937 Treaty,
Iraq took the initiative. Iraq’s response to Iran’s
abrogation of this treaty was to declare the treaty valid and
binding on both sides. Furthermore, to put Iran on the
defensive, Iraq shifted its strategy to the offensive by
reviving the issue of Arabistan. This shift was evident in
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April, 1969, tuhen the Iraqi Deputy Premier and Interiors*
Minister, General Salih Mahdi Ammash, stated that there were
no differences between Iraq and Iran over the Shatt al-Arab
because it was Iraqi territory. However, the "differences
should have been over Arabistan, which is Iraqi territory
annexed to Iran during the foreign mandate and which is
called Ahvaz against the will of the Iraqi people.(27)
It IS interesting to observe that the issue of Arabistan
and its manipulation by Iraq depended on the nature of
relations between Iraq and Iran. The more relations between
the two sides deteriorated, the more acute the issue became.
Thus, as a countei—measure against Iran’s abrogation of the
1937 Treaty, the Ea’ath Government reactivated the Arabistan
issue by announcmg the formation of the Popular Front for
the Liberation of Arabistan in June, 1969.(28)
The Arabistanians’ struggle grew more and more to achieve
the end of the Shah’s regime. After the Islamic Revolution
of 1979 in Iran, the Arab people of Arabistan, expected to be
afforded more autonomy, but they were disappointed. The new
regime in Iran refused to permit them any of their demands.
Therefore, "Arab protests occurred and sabotage of oil
pipe—lines was blamed on Arab Natlonalists*.(29) The
Ayatollah Khakhali, President of the Revolution Courts in
Iran, claimed during his visit to Bahrain, that Iraq and
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other Gulf countries are sending ueapons to Arabistan and to^j,
Muhammarah.(30)
On the other hand, Shibli a1 -Aissami, the Assistant
Secretary of the National Conimand of the Ba’ath Party
declared in April, 1979:
The important thing is that Arabistan should have
autonomy and self-government, democracy and
freedom. The Iranians now say there is no need for
nationality rights because in Islam all is one, but
this is a formalist answer.(31)
In fact, the Iranian Government did everything possible
to make the Shatt ai—Arab River the common property of Iran
and Iraq together. Therefore, the occupation of Arabistan
since 1925 was a step to achieve tier goal. This occupation
allowed Iran to take control of a part of the Shatt ai—Arab
River.
In short, Arabistan (Khuzistan) plays a different role in
the hostilities between both countries. For Baghdad, two
potential gains stand out during the Iraqi initiative attack
on Arabistan province in 1980- First, Arabistan, whose
population has historically been Arabs, appears to the Ba’ath
Party as part of the Arab Nation. It would be a supreme act
of Pan—Arabism to win this land for the Arabs. Second,
control of Arabistan would end Iraq’s vexing lack of Arabian
Gulf shoreline. These possible advantages to Iraq are so
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great that probably they must have entered into Iraq’s
calculations and added importantly to other reasons for going
to war in 1980.
RIVALRY OVER THE ARABIAN GULF
Britain’s withdrawal from the Arabian Gulf area in 1971,
injected an element of confusion and uncertainty into a
highly strategic area. The removal of the British protective
umbrella led to fears over the resultant military and
political vacuum in the Sulf, and its impact on the region’s
political stability. The issue of political stability in the
area was complicated by the existence of many small, wealthy
states characterized by tenuous political and institutional
structures in a region fraught with tribal, territorial,
dynastic and historical disputes.
The issues that are likely to cause disputes between Iraq
and Iran are the Iranian claims to Bahrain, the Iranian
occupation of the three Arab Islands: Abu Musa, Greater and
Lesser Tunbs. Iraq’s demands on Iran to return these three
Arab Islands to their owner, the United Arab Emirates, is
another source of the continuing conflict. Also, the
rivalries between these two countries to be the dominating
power in the Gulf region has increased the tensions between
t hem.
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a. Iranian Claim to Bahrain:
Another source of conflict in Iraqi-Iranian relations in
the Gulf centred on uihat the Arabs perceived as Iran’s
irredentism in the area, as manifested in its claim to
Bahrain. Iran’s claim to Bahrain fuelled Arab suspicions of
its intentions in the region and also served as a catalyst
for sharpening Arab—Iranian polarization in the area. Hence
the various Arab regimes in the Gulf, notwithstanding their
ideological and political differences, were united in
resisting Iran’s claims to Bahrain. Relations between Iraq
and Iran were strained by the Iranian’s "historical" claim to
Bahrain.
Bahrain is comprised of a group of islands located midway
down the Arab Gulf approximately IS miles from the east coast
of Saudi Arabia.(see Map no. 12) The population of Bahrain
is approximately 360,000 and it consists of thirty three
islands that total 258 square miles.(32)
After many centuries of independence, ,Bahrain was
occupied by the Portugese from 1521 to 1602. Iran’s ties to
Bahrain began in 1602 when the Persians expelled the
Portugese occupiers. The Persian’s occupation of Bahrain
continued from 1602 to 1783. Under the native tribe of
Utubi, the Arabs were able to end the Persian occupation in
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1783.(33) In fact, €?ven after the Utubi tribe forced the
Iranian forces out of Bahrain, Iran refused to relinquish
claim to these islands based on their occupation from 1602 to
1783. Through a special relationship between the Sheikh of
Bahrain and Britain, the Bahrain Islands fell under British
domination in 1880. The British imperialist domination of
Bahrain kept it from falling under Iran’s control. Oil was
discovered in 1932 and first exported in 1934, and that gave
Bahrain economical importance in addition to its strategic
location in the Arab Gulf.(34)
For the interest of Iran, the Shah attempted to settle
the Bahrain Islands issue before the British withdrawal from
the Gulf region. Therefore, secret negotiations took place
between Tehran, New York, London, and Bahrain. After these
negotiations, the Bahrain issue was brought to the United
Nations.(35) Finally, when Bahrain became independent on
August 14, 1971, Iran was the first country to recognise its
sovereignty only one hour after the announcement of
independence.(36)
In fact, the Shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, relinquished
his claims to Bahrain as a result of the bargain with Britain
to allow Iran to occupy the three Arab Islands in the Gulf:
Abu Musa, Greater and Lesser Tunbs. Anthony H. Cordesman,
who has served as a U. S- government official in Iran stated:
The Shah also gave up Iran’s claim to Bahrain in
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May, 1970, although this may have been part of a
complex bargain with Britain to allow him to seize
several strategic islands and offshore oil fields
in the Gulf. In any case, the Shah confined his
actions to a massive military buildup, to deploying
an Iranian military presence on Qu’oin Islands in
the Strait of Hormuz, and to seizing the Abu Musa
and Tumb islands in the Gulf.(37)
However, the ruler of Iran is unimportant because this
country’s ambitions in the Arab lands in the Gulf region have
not changed for hundreds of years. As a matter of fact this
still remains a constant issue. The Iranian claim to the
Bahrain Islands re—emerged after the fall of the Shah of Iran
and the emergence of the Islamic Republic. For example, on
April IS, 1980, Sadeqh Rouhani, one of the Iranian Islamic
Leaders of the new regime in Iran declared as follows:
Bahrain is an integral part of the Iranian
territory. According to the new constitution of
Iran, Bahrain constitutes the fourteenth department
of Iran. In the Algeria Agreement the dethroned
Shah made too many territorial concessions to Iraq.
Today, we feel there is a need to elucidate Iran’s
position on Bahrain due to the claims formulated by
certain Arab countries, notably Iraq, regarding the
three islands in the Gulf.<38)
Moverover, the Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister, Mr.
Sadeqh Ghotbzadeh declared during an interview with Radio
Monte-Carlo on April 30, 1980 that "all the countries in the
Gulf are historically a part of Iranian territory".(39)
Concerning the Iranian claims to Bahrain, in fact, there
is no difference between the Shah’s expansionist policy and
the ambitions of the new Islamic regime under Ayatollah
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Khomeini. However, a new element was added to the historical
claim to Bahrain by the Iranian new regime. This new element
is the connection between the Shi’ite population of the two
countries.(40) Different methods were attempted by Iran.
The Bahrainian Government announced in December, 1981, that
seventy three persons were arrested after an unsuccessful
attempt to overthrow the Bahrainian Government. It also
announced that these individuals were trained in Iran.(41)
b. Iranian Occupation of the three Arab Islands:
The Shah’s occupation of the three strategic Arab Islands
is another element which has sharpened hostility between Iraq
and Iran. More importantly, Iran’s use of military force to
seize the islands lent credence to Iraq’s warnings of the
Shah’s expansionist ambitions in the Gulf region. By the
same token, Iran’s resort to force exacerbated Arab fears and
apprehensions about the Shah’s military build-up.
The importance of the strategic location of these three
islands is very clear. Abu Musa and the Tunbs Islands are
located at the mouth of the Strait of Hormuz. They command
the Strait of Hormuz, which connects the Arab Gulf to the
Gulf of Oman and Arabian Sea, providing a channel through
which the Gulf oil is shipped. Due to their closeness to the
Strait of Hormuz, Abu Musa, Greater and Lesser Tunbs Islands
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hold a significant interest. In an article the French
Neufspaper, Le Monde, stated:
Back-to—back with coasts of the Emirates, these
three islands constitute observation posts for the
coastline of the Gulf countries; United Arab
Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait,
Iraq and Iran.(42) (see Map no.13)
From a strategic point of view, any power dominating these
three islands strengthens its position in the Strait of
Hormuz. Also, it controls the entire Gulf region militarily,
politically and commercially. These three islands are very
rich in minerals. They may have oil under or close to them.
In fact, discoveries of oil have been made in Abu Musa’s
territorial waters, but go untapped due to competition
between British and American oil companies.(43)
Most researchers specializing in ancient history who
visited the Gulf region believe that Abu Musa Island rightly
belongs to the Sheikhdom of Sharjah. Also, they believe that
the two Tunbs Islands belong to the Sheikhdom of Ras
al—Khaimah. These two sheikhdoms became members of the
United Arab Emirates in 1971.(44)
The Iranian policy towards the sheikhdoms took the form
of threats during 1970 and 1971. For example, in February,
1971, the Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, affirmed that
"unlike the dispute over Bahrain, Iran would be prepared to
resort to force to re-establish its authority over the
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islands.“(45) Moreover, the Shah declared on June 24, 1971,
that the three Gulf islands “had been grabbed some eighty
years ago at a time (uhen Iran had no central government....
Otherwise we have no alternative but to take the islands by
force."(46) Thus, the Iranian forces landed on these three
islands and occupied them on the same day of the British
withdrawal on November 3t3, 1971.(47)
The Iranians argued that their occupation of the three
islands was committed to stabilizing the region and would
ensure freedom of navigation in the Gulf.(48) Iran added
that “its objective was to defend the security of the Gulf
against the entry of foreign powers*.(49) In addition, the
prospect for major discovery of oil in these islands is very
promising! this would be of considerable economic value to
Iran.(50)
The Iraqi Government described the occupation as “a
preliminary step to the creation of a new Palestine in the
Arab Gulf".(51) Moreover, Iraq began to warn that Iran’s
military build-up was a tool "to support the expansionist
policy of Iran, to threaten every neighbouring country that
resists that policy.., and to impose a self-proclaimed
hegemony over the area".(52) In addition, the Iraqis
declared angrily that they “will take any and every measure
to preserve Iraq’s rights against Iranian regional
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expansionism”.(53) In return, the Iranian Government warned
■all outsiders against intervening" and added that its
occupation is "a purely internal move".(54) At this
Juncture, Iraqi-Iranian relations reached a new low. In
fact, the Iranian occupation of the three islands threatend
Iraqis lifeline from both sides of the Gulf.
The Shah^s fall, however, presented increased tensions
between Baghdad and Tehran. The islands question was
reopened by the Iraqi Government. On behalf of the owner of
the three islands, the United Arab Emirates, Dr. Sa’adoun
Hammadi, the Iraqi Foreign Affairs Minister, sent a letter to
the Secretary General of the United Nations on April 6, 1980.
He demanded Iran’s withdrawal from these islands and stated
that Iraq "does not recognize Iran’s ownership of these
islands".(55)
However, the Iranian reaction was extremely sharp.
Sadeqh Ghotbzadeh, the Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister,
declared that "we will not give up one inch of our sacred
country on which stands the flag of Islam and Iran”.(56) He
added, "if everybody were to claim any place on historic
excuses, the Mada’en (a city in Iraq which was the capital
city of the Persians during the Sassanian Dynasty) and
Baghdad should be ours".(57) In his warning to the Arab
countries, Ghotbzadeh, said that "if the Arab states do not
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stop their provocations, we will repulse them with all means
and with all our power."(58)
Hostilities have increased between Iraq and Iran since
Iraq demanded the immediate retreat of Iranian forces from
the three islands. One of Iraq’s demands to end the conflict
with Iran was the return of the islands to their owner.
Concerning these demands, the Iraqi President, Saddam
Hussein, declared that "the Shah occupied three Arab islands
in the Gulf. If the revolution is an Islamic one, then why
have they not returned the islands to their Arab owners7'(59)
Concerning the occupation of the three Arab islands, the
Khomeini regime’s policy is shown to be the same as the
Shah’s policy. As per a speech made by the President of Iraq
on September 17, 1980, he said;
We had sincerely hoped that Khomeini would be
different from the Shah in his positions on our
national and pan-Arab causes, particularly the
cause of the occupied Arab territories. We gave
him enough time to prove whether he was really
different from the Shah or not. Yet he and those
ruling with him in Iran these days proved that they
are no different from the Shah in their
expansionist ambitions and in their racist stands
toward the Arabs. They have unjustly maintained
all the Iraqi territories which the Shah occupied
and maintained the three Arab islands of Greater
Tunb, Lesser Tunb and Abu Musa.(60)
However, the leaders of the new regime in Iran claimed
that their viewpoint was quite different from the Shah’s.(61)
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In sutTimary, the continuation of Iranian’s ambitious
policy is very obvious. The former Shah of Iran Justified
his occupation of the islands by arguing that if these
islands fell under "foreign powers" which he meant the Soviet
Union, they would strategically threaten Iran’s security.
Shown in a similar way, the Khomeini regime argued that if
Iran abandon these islands, they would fall under U.S.
domination, and Iran’s security would be seriously
threatened. In spite of the different excuses, Iran’s
objectives are in reality the same.
Iraq's demand for the return of the three islands to
their rightful owners has earned them a distinctive
importance. The President of Iraq has asserted many times
that this is necessary for peace with Iran.
c. Regional Power:
There is a consensus among students of Iran’s foreign
policy that, historically, Iran has always played and will
continue to play a leading role in the Gulf region. Many
Political analysts believe that historical and economic
imperatives dictate that Iran assume a paramount role in Gulf
affairs, "no matter who rules in Iran".(62)
The Iranian-Arab power conflict over the Arab Gulf was in
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full bloom as early as the fourth century. Iran’s attempts
to be the dominant pouier in the Gulf region added a new
dimension to the long conflict between Iraq and Iran.
Tensions increased between Baghdad and Tehran when the Shah’s
ambitious policy began in the Arab Gulf. The events of the
1950s and 1960s in the Middle East signaled the emergence of
the U.S. as a major power in the region, especially since the
decline of the British traditional role. The U.S. was
looking for allies and a foothold to maintain its interests
in the Middle East. The Shah of Iran welcomed the alliance
with the U.S. for his own interests.
Faced with growing Iranian ambitions, Iraqi leaders in
the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s felt increasingly
isolated politically among the conservative and hereditary
regimes in the Gulf. Their sense of isolation was heightened
when in late 1972 the United States declared that it would
depend on regional allies, especially Iran and Saudi Arabia,
to act as political stabilizers -the so-called two pillar
policy. The concern of Iraqi leaders became even sharper-
after Iran became a major buyer of American military hardware
and the de facto guardian of the Gulf. American military
equipment had begun to flow in significant quantities after
1955; between 1973-74 and 1976—77 more than one-third of all
American foreign military sales were made to Iran. Total
U.S. arms sales to Iran between 1972 and 1976 amounted to
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*10.6 billion.(63)
As a matter of fact, Iran’s military bases became the
most powerful arsenal in the Gulf region. The Shah attempted
to use his military strength to control the region. In
addition to its claim of security, Iran’s policy in the Gulf
was influenced by far-reaching economic interests.
The U.S. decision to make Iran its military ally in the
Middle East was the catalyst that caused Iraq to sign a 15
year friendship treaty with the Soviet Union on April 9,
1972. It also was one of the reasons Iraq began its military
build up.
It is now clear that Iran was in competition with Iraq
for superiority in the Arab Gulf. Consequently, Iraq and
Iran had been involved in a low-level arms race since the
Iraqi Nationalist Revolution of July 14, 1958. Each of them
had sought to modernize its military forces. Since the
British announced that they would withdraw from the region,
the military rivalry increased among the two countries for
military and political dominance in the Gulf.
In fact, Iran’s preponderant military power had a
destabilizing impact on the Gulf region because it: 1)
exacerbated Iraq’s fears of Iran’s hegemony in the Gulf,
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fears uihich, in turn, contributed to
consolidating its links with the USSR as
force against Iran’s military superiority;
Shah to utilize his military capability to
<i.e., seizure of the three Arab islands in
created a dangerous arms race in a





the Gulf); and 3)
volatile region.
Moreover, the transfer of arms from the
was of great benefit in opposing radical
revoiutionary organizations in the Gulf
O’Neill analyzed the policy of American arms









"enabling Tehran to play a stabilizing role in the
region by actively opposing revolutionary groups
and regimes such as PFLO C the Popular Front for
the Liberation of Oman 1, Iraq, and the PDRY E the
People Democratic Republic of Yeman 1.... It also
may be considered a visable alternative to the use
of American military forces against radical groups
that might threaten United States’ interests in the
Persian Gulf"(65)
The U.S. arms sales to Iran had far reaching effects. It
was meant to stabilize the Gulf region, but in effect it
served the Shah’s policy and became apparent in many ways.
This gave Iran the upper hand in the area. In dealing with
its neighbors, Iran supported the Kurdish rebellion in
northern Iraq to keep the Iraqi Army fighting within its
boundaries and to drain its military capabilities (see
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chapter 2). Also, by supporting the Kurdish rebels, Iran
attempted to distract Iraq’s attention auiay from Gulf
affairs.(66) The U.S. arms transfer helped give the Shah the >
power to force the Iraqi Government to concede the east side
of the Shatt ai-Arab River on March 6, 1975, in accordance
with the Algeria Agreement. Iraq was forced to settle its
disputes with Iran on Iranian terms. In fact, this was the
catalyst that planted the seeds of the present day war. Even
occupation of the three Arab islands in 1971 was seen by Iran
as a move to ensure free navigation in the Strait of Hormuz.
Moreover, the Shah feared that there would be an increase in
the Arab nationalist movement in the Gulf. Iranian troops
were sent to Oman in 1973, to put an end to the leftist
guerrillas there. The Iraqi Government protested this
intervention. The deployment of Iranian troops, warplanes
and helicopters in Oman was part of Iran’s expansionist
policy.
Arms transfers to Iran led to an arms race in the region.
In turn this held a great potential for an armed conflict
between Iraq and Iran. The Gulf area is very rich in oil.
It also has many disputes such as territorial, tribal, ■
continental shelf, dynastic, ideological, political and
economic.(67) The massive arms race aggravated the already
existing conflicts in this region. The Shah had the largest
build up of arms in the Gulf region, and this vast
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inheritance of military equipment mas passed on to the
Khomeini regime. Bettueen 1972 and 1979, Iran mas leading
Iraq in the arms race as shomn in tables 1 and 2. It is
clear from tables 1 and 2 that the arms race betuieen Iraq and
Iran continued after the Algeria Agreement of 1975.
Iran’s impressive quantitative and qualitative edge in
military capabilities led military analysts to view her as
the dominant power in the Gulf region. Hence it mas assumed
that a combination of Iraqi—Saudi military farces mas not
capable of providing an effective challenge to Iran's
military machine without recourse to the external assistance
of a superpower.<68)
Nonetheless, the question arises as to mhether this
disequilibrium of the military balance in Iran’s favour mas
conducive to stability and peace in the Gulf region. Some
analysts contend that the military balance plays a
"stabilizing role only mhen there is a relatively equal pomer
distribution among the principal countries of an area or
region".(69)
Because of this large military build up, Iran’s role of
maintaining stability in the Gulf Zone led to an opposite
effect. Professor Enver M. Koury stated that:
76
In a “zone of tension and troubles* the military
build-up of one country (i.e., Iran) at the expense
of the others could hardly be described as an
effort to reinforce a "point of stability". Such a
disparity in military power is bound to elevate
tension in the area and to increase the arms race
among the rivals.<70)
In addition to his false fear from the Iraqi—Soviet
treaty of 1972, the Shah initiated armed conflict with Iraq
over the borders to receive larger quantities of American
advanced military equipment such as FI4 and F16 warplanes.
Iranian officers talked about "teaching the Iraqis a
lesson*.(71) As Anthony Sampson said: "The Shah likes to be
prickly and then his neighbors decide they want to be prickly
too. They don’t really want to go to war. But the problem
IS, when you get a lot of playthings, how long is it before
you want to try them out*.(72)
The cumulative effects of Iran’s massive modernization of
its military forces were unsettling for its Arab Gulf
neighbours, especially Iraq. It heightened their anxiety and
apprehension as to the Shah’s ultimate intentions. Iran’s
military build-up was also viewed with scepticism by several
U.S. officials, who had questions about the Shah’s ambitions
in the region. Even the CIA, in a secret memorandum written
by David £lee, a former Deputy Director of the CIA’s Covert
Operations, and published by the Washington Post, raised
doubts about the Shah’s objectives.(73)
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The Shah’s policy of establishing Iranian superiority in
the Gulf region developed into a potentially dangerous
condition, especially in case of domestic Iranian changes.
In this respect, a few months before the Shah’s fall, Leslie
M. Pryor wrote in the Summer of 1978:
Should the Shah himself be removed from power - a
development that cannot be ruled out - a struggle
for influence in the region could break out, either
in the form of an Arab move against Iran or an
Iranian move, led by a hawkish military Junta,
against a neighbor.(74)
The Iraqi—Iranian war was the realistic application of
Pryor’s extraordinary prediction.
Since Ayatollah Khomeini came to power in Iran in 1979,
the new regime has constantly called on the masses in the
Gulf states to overthrow their governments and replace them
with Islamic regimes, similar to Khomeini’s regime. The
Islamic enthusiasm of the Iranian leaders was seen in some
ways as a continuance of the Shah’s desire to reform the Gulf
area in Iran’s image. Iranian news media described the Gulf
governments as "corrupt" regimes. Ironically, the former
Shah of Iran used the same propaganda in 1969. He Justified
his intervention in Gulf states affairs by describing these
states as: "weak governments, weak countries, corrupt ...
where the element of subversion will have free ground for
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their activities".<75) In this same way, the Iranian
President, Ali Khamenei, in early October, 1980, described
all the Gulf governments as unbelievers, and continued;
They have betrayed Islam and the Koran. The
sheikhs of the Persian Gulf — these greedy pigs
which know nothing but satisfying their lust, these
sheikhs who have spent their whole life plundering
your wealth - We will destroy all the dwarfs if
they continue to support falsehood against right.
All of you must raise the flag of the Islamic
revolution everywhere.(76)
In fact, Iran, whether under the Shah’s regime or
Khomeini’s, has claimed the right to intervene directly
against local governments which threaten its idea of balance
of power. In a comparison of Khomeini’s threat in the Gulf
States to that of the Shah’s, Professor Koury wrote: "By any
standard of measurement, the combined ceal of Islamic
ideology and Khomeini’s hunger for expansion is far more
deadly than that of the Shah’s lust for personal power and
glory".(77) Through its intervention in the Gulf states
affairs, Khomeini’s regime has attempted to restore Iran’s
hegemony over the Gulf area.
Iraq was the main local opponent of Iran’s hegemony in
the Gulf during the Shah’s reign. After his fall, Iraq -
with its Pan-Arab ideology — has presented itself as a
protector of the Arab Gulf States. For example, when the
Iranian’s new regime threatened Bahrain, Latif Nusayyif
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Jasiiri, the Iraqi Minister of Culture and Information,
declared in September, 1980: "uihoever attacks Bahrain will be
demolished with bombs. The land of Bahrain is the land of
Arabs and it is our duty to defend it".(78) Iran’s
intervention in the internal affairs of the Arab Gulf States
was condemned by the Iraqi Foreign Affairs Minister. He
added: ®Iraq is determind to defend the Arab nation and the
Arabian Gulf region".(79) On the other hand, Khomeini’s
regime had presented Iran as a protector of the Shi’ite
population. He constantly appeals for the Arab Gulf Shi’ites
to revolt against their governments. This has been the
Iranian re‘oime’s attitude toward the Gulf States since the
revolution. All of the things previously mentioned caused
more tensions and hostilities between both countries.
In summary, Britain’s attitude towards the Shah’s
ambitions in the Gulf region was crucial. Instead of
resisting his occupation of the three Arab islands, Britain
sought conciliation.
The Iraqi—Iranian rivalry was a quest for a pre-eminent
role in Gulf politics. Iran’s perceived role as the guardian
of Gulf security clashed with Iraq’s perception of its role
as the guardian and bulwark of Arabism in the Gulf. However,
Iraqi-Iranian rivalry to project influence in the Gulf was a
function of the prevailing regional balance of power. which
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(lias decisively in Iran’s favour. Iran’s military superiority
uias a source of anxiety not only for Iraq, but also for the
Arab Gulf states. These states, in particular Iraq, began to
be concerned about the Shah’s ultimate intentions in the Gulf
region, especially in the aftermath of Iran’s occupation of
the three islands of Abu Musa and the Tunbs. The
Iraqi—Irani an clash in the Gulf centred on Iran’s ^ clainr* to
Bahrain, its occupation of the three Arab Islands, and the
projection of its military power in Oman.
Iran’s policy in the Gulf area continued after the Shah’s
fall. The new Iranian regime showed hostility toward Iraq
and other Arab Gulf states. The Khomeini regime has used the
face of religion as a mask to cover Iran’s policy in the
area. In return, Iraq has proclaimed itself as a protector
of the Arab Gulf States.
IRAN’S SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH ISRAEL:
The Shah’s good relationship and policies concerning
Israel caused tensions within the Arab World. The
Iranian—Israeli ties became one of the strongest arguments
used by Iraq and President Nasser of Egypt to disgrace the
Shah in the 1960’s. They accused him of aligning Iran with
Israel, the arch-enemy of the Arabs. Moreover, Israeli aid
to the Kurdish rebellion through Iranian territory increased
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hostilities between Iraq and Iran.
Despite the denial of the Khomeini regime, Israel
supplies weapons to Iran. This has increased tensions in the
Middle East. It has become one of the most potent propaganda
campaigns used by Iraq against the Ayatollah Khomeini.
•
a. Iran—Israel: Bilateral Relationships During the Shah’s
era:
One of the most important fields of Jranian—Israeli
co-operation during the Shah’s reign is the military field.
Military relations between them are very close. In this
respect, E.A. Bayne stated that "every general in the Shah’s
army has visited Israel and hundreds of Junior officers have
undergone some aspect of Israeli training".(80) Bayne added,
"Iran maintains a close military liaison with Israeli Army
Staff".(81) Moreover, in an interview with the Shah of Iran,
conducted by the Egyptian Journalist Mohamrriad Heikal, he
declared that “Iran’s cooperation with Israel was not
restricted to the intelligence field, but included an
exchange of all weapons in the army".(82) It appears that
the Shah believed that his aid to Israel would make her
stronger and that would force the Arabs to focus their
military sights on Israel. In other words, the more the Arabs
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disputes. In this respect, Professor Koury stated:
Tehran needs a “common front" with Israel to
establish Iran’s dominant position in the Gulf
area, and to cope with possible Arab subversion in
Baluchistan, Kurdistan and Khuzestan (Arabistan).
Furthermore, Israel needs the cooperation of Iran
to divert some of the Arab enmity toward Iran and
away from itself. Some leaders from both sides
advocate closer ties with each other as the best
deterrent to Arab potential strength.... In
essence, then, Iran and Israel share a common
interest based on mutual dependency, thus making
the potential values of a non—Arab alliance more
urgently needed.(83)
The strategic utilization of Israel for the Shah as a
bulwark. sigainst the expansion of the nationalist Arab
movement in the Middle East increased significantly in the
1950s and early 1960s. Two major reasons for this are: 1)
the Iraqi nationalist revolution of 1958 and its withdrawal
from the Baghdad Pact; and 2) the rapid establishment of the
new relations between Baghdad and Moscow, along with Soviet
military assistance to the revolutionary regime in Iraq.(84)
From the Shah’s point of view, this seemed to bring
revolutionary Arabs to the Iranian threshold. While the Arab
nationalist movement saw Iraq’s withdrawal from the Baghdad
Pact as assault against Israel. On the other hand, Iran
believed that the balance of power in the Middle East had
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shifted against itself and Israel in favour of the Arab
radicalism. For Iran, Israel appeared to be the strongest
state of anti-revolutionary Arabs. Briefly, “Iran was
befriending its enemy’s enemy".(85)
Despite the Shah’s friendly attitude toward President
Sadat during the October War of 1973, he continued to supply
Israel with Iranian oil.(86) Indeed, in 1975 the Shah sought
to use his oil supplies to Israel as leverage in an attempt
to induce Israel to relinquish its control over the Egyptian
oilfields in the occupied Sinai Desert. In return for
Israel’s relinquishing these oilfields, the Shah promised to
provide Israel with additional supplies of Iranian oil.(87)
Ii'an’s role to promote an Arab—Israeli settlement was
recognized by >the U.B. Government when Alfred Atherton, the
Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian
Affairs, stated in November, 1975 that "without Iran’s
encouragement, our efforts to promote a peaceful settlement
would have been far more difficult".(88)
From the Iraqi point of view, the Shah’s encouragement to
promote a peaceful settlement between Egypt and Israel,
indeed was an imperialist attempt to encircle the
revolutionary regimes and destroy the Arab unity. However,
Iran’s military, commercial and political ties with Israel,
Iraq’s arch-enemy, embittered the Iraq-Iran relations. The
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effectiveness of Iranian—Israeli co-operation was manifested
against Iraq through Israeli support to the Kurdish rebellion
which is discussed below.
b. Israeli Role in the Kurdish Rebellion:
Israel has shown an increasing interest in svjpporting the
Kurdish rebels. The Israeli secret aid to the Kurdish
rebellion stemmed from its co—operation witli the Shah of
Iran. Israel’s goals of supporting the Kurds was to weaken
Iraq and discourage any deployment of Iraqi forces on the
eastern front against Israel. In regard to Israel, Iraq’s
refusal of Israel’s existance is one of fche most important
reasons why Israel has supported the Kurdish rebellion.
Despite the fact that Iraq is not a. front-line state, it
has participated in ail the wars against Israel. Iraq has
always taken the extreme view that war should be continued
with Israel until its destruction. Another reason which led
Israel to aid the Kurdish rebellion was to neutralize or
reduce Iraq’s role in the Arab World and also in any
Potential Arab-Israeli war. In fact, Israel apparently
attempted to open a second front line against the Iraqi Army
by supporting the Kurdish rebels.(89)
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Despite Israel’s denial, its clandestine support for the
Kurdish rebellion was disclosed by Obeidullah, the eldest son
of the rebellion’s leader, Mustafa al-Barzani and Aziz
Akrawi, who served as a member of the central political
directorate for Barzani as one of his top military
commanders. In an interview, Obeiduilah and Akrawi were
asked why they had defected to trie Iraqi Government. They
replied that "it was because he Cal—Brzanil had become so
beholden to the (imperialist) Iran and Israel".(90) Akrawi
added that:
there had for many months been in the mountains an
Israeli mission of four men equipped with radios
operating to Tel Aviv. These men, used code names
like Ahmed and Mustafa.... They had tried to use
the Kurdish party’s links to the interior of Iraq
to influence its policies and to gather information
of interest to Israel.(91)
The Israeli Prime Minister, Menachem Begin, disclosed
officially on September 29, 1980, that "Israel had provided
the Kurdish guerrillas with money, arms and instructors from
1965 to 1975".(92) Prime Minister Begin added that Israel
had provided the Kurdish rebels with Israeli military
advisers to train them.(93) Through Iranian territory,
Israel supplies the Kurdish rebels with some Soviet—made
military equipment, which was captured by Israel during the
1967 war.(9A) Iran increasingly became a passage for arms
channelled from Israel to the Kurdish rebels. Moreover, Lee
Dinsmore, the former American consul in Kirkuk (north of
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Iraq), asserted that Israel sent instructors to Iran, to
trained the Kurdish rebels.(95) Indeed, Iranian—Israeli
common objectives for uieakening Iraq, enabled Israel’s aid to
reach the Kurdish rebels through Iranian territory.
The U.S., Iran and Israel appear to have been motivated
by their desire to keep the Iraqi radical regime embroiled in
an internal conflict in order to minimise Iraq’s military
potential. The Kurdish incident showed that the common
interests of the U.S., Iran and Israel in weakening the
revolutionary governmeni of Iraq led these countries to use
the Kurds as a pawn. In fact, the Iranian-Israeli
involvement in the Kurdish issue had negative effects on the
Iraqi-Iranian relationship and has embitterd their conflict.
c. The Israeli Attitude Toward the War:
It IS clear that Israel, politically and strategica11y,
is regarded as the main beneficiary from the Iraq—Iran War.
The Iraqi—Iranian War has had far—reaching implications for
the Arab-Israeli conflict.
Thus, it will continue to be in Israeli’s benefit to
protract the Gulf War. In regard to this policy, Israeli
Deputy Defense Minister, Mordekhay Tzipori, declared on
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September 28, 1980, that ’"Israel could give Iran significant
help and permit it, logistically speaking, to continue its
ujar against Iraq". (96) Moreover, a member of the Foreign
Affairs and Security Committee in the Knesset suggested on
September 29, 1980, that Israel should take the first step in
resuming relations with Iran. He added, that Israel "is a
natural source for request for aid from Iran as it could
supply it with U.S.—made spare parts and other equipment used
by the Iranian Army".(97) Obviously, these statements were
an indirect message to the Khomeini regime showing Israel’s
willingness to cooperate with Iran.
It was revealed that Israel had sent weapons and spare
parts to Iran. Israel Justified its military support for
Iran on "the grounds that the sale wtouid retain some
pro-Western connection with Iran”.(98) Israeli officials
insisted that their military arms, which were sent to Iran,
were on small scale. In fact, Zbigniew Brzezinski, National
Security Adviser of President Carter disclosed that Israel
had secretly supplied Iran with U.S.-made spare parts in
October, 1980.(99; However, American officials argued that
Israel intended to weaken the Iraqi Army by supporting Iran
with military arms and enabling her to continue the war
against Iraq.(100)
Despite the Khomeini regime’s denial there were many
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reports covering secret Israeli arms sales to Iran. Obvious
proof came after the incident with the Argentinean plane on
July 18, 1981. It was reported that an Argentinean cargo
plane ferrying Israeli arms via Cyprus to Iran crashed in
Soviet territory. This incident was the first evidence of
the Iranian-Israeli military collaboration. Borne Israeli
officials, according to the London BBC TV network, believed
that the Soviet Union deliberately shot down the plane "to
expose the Israeli—Iranian relationship and to prevent Israel
from rebuilding its Iranian contacts".(101)
Moreover, in a television interview, the former Iranian
President Eani-Sader, revealed that Israel was supplying
spare parts and armaments to Iran.<102) Regardless of
Khomeini’s inflammatory rhetoric against Israel, Iran was
supplied with Israeli arms and spare parts. According to the
f>tew York Times, Menachem Begin described Iraq as Israel’s
major enemy in the Middle East. In addition, an American
diplomat in the Carter administration believed that the
motivation behind Israel’s aid to Iran was "an overwhelming
Israeli desire not to see Iraq win the war".(103) In fact,
Israel’s arms sales to Iran are reminiscent of Israeli aid to
the Kurdish rebellion, which was also aimed at weakening
Iraqi military power. An Israeli official expressed Israel’s
previous mentioned goal. He said that "ideally we would like
to see Iraq disintegrate into a Shiite Kurdish and Sunni
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community, each making war on the other*.(104)
Indeed, The strategic cooperation of Israel and Iran did
not change when Khomeini came to power because of the
geopolitical realities. In this respect. Professor Koury
believes that there is a direct link between the Arab-Israeli
conflict zone and the Gulf zone. He added:
Nor is it unusual to envision the revival of an
Iranian—Israeli axis — albeit tacitly - as was the
case during the Shaii’s reign. For Iran and Israel,
the benefits of such a possible arrangement would
outweigh the losses. The Isreali arms sale to
Khomeini’s regime as a result of the Iran-Iraq war'
could be a prelude to a wider arrangement. Putting
aside the reasons behind the Iran-Iraq war and the
Israeli invasion of the Lebanon, the net result has
been a direct linkage between the "chessboards” of
conflicts in the Gulf zone and the Arab-Israeli
zone. Under such mitigating circumstances, a
temporary arrangement between Iran and Israel
should not be dismissed. However deep their
mistrust and hatred of each other, Iran and Israel
have — though for different reasons — the same
basic objectives; namely, to prevent a united Arab
policy and/or regional harmony. The fact that Iran
and Israel continue to assert their military
capabilities over the Arab World raises a number of
concerns. It is important to keep in mind this
reality when assessing the long-term consequences,
and in particular the prospects for stability in
the Gulf area.(105)
In sumimary. The Iraqi-Iranian conflict was seen
as an opportunity to weaken Iraq, whose military
considered to be the most dangerous threat to
existence. Israel has supported Iran with military






victory, Israel believes, would militarily pose a real threat
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on Israel’s eastern front. Politically it utould solidify the
Arabs in opposing the Canip David Treaty (The Egyptian-lsrael i
Peace Treaty). The war also encouraged Israel to strike at
the Iraqi nuclear facility in June, 1981. Generally
speaking, Iraq’s ability to directly threaten Israeli
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CHAPTER IV
THE ISSUE OF THE WAR
The fall of the Shah’s regime in January, 1979, and the
accession to power of Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran signalled a
return to cold war and confrontation in Iraqi-Iranian
relations. The depth of the hostility between Iraq and Iran
has been very clear since the first days of Khomeini’s rule.
Within a few months of his rise to power, Khomeini began to
call for an Islamic revolution in Iraq. The Ayatollah
Khomeini has used religious propaganda against the Iraqi
Socialist, Nationalist Government which separates politics
and religion. The regional status quo, which was nurtured
and maintained by the Shah of Iran and the Iraqi Government
since the Algeria Agreement of 1975, was challenged by the
Khomeini regime. Khomeini’s hostile behaviour toward the
Ba’athist regime in Iraq has increased tensions and
hostilities between the two countries and finally led to the
present day war.
The focus of this chapter is on the following:
The Ideological Clashes




The potential for controversy was heightened by the fact
that the Ba’ath Party in Iraq based its rule on the premise
of Arab Nationalism. Therefore the party rejected the notion
that unity should be achieved through the common denominator
of Islam irrespective of one’s ethnic origins. Rather the
Ba’athists believed that Arabism should be the shared ideal
whether one was a Muslim or Christian. Therefore, when
Iranian statements as early as March, 1979 asked that Arab
and State Nationalism be submerged or eliminated, wherever
Muslims resided, for the greater unity of the Islamic
Revolution, serious concerns began to arise in Iraq about the
possibility of sectarian strife.
President Hussein emphasized the potential consequences
and his fear of this fundamental disagreement between the two
ideologies as early as October, 1979. He described the Arab
Revolution as a qualitative transformation that derived its
values from history and religion. However, he went on to say
that:
"in order for the Islamic revolution or any other
revolution to be Islamic, it must be a friend of
the Arab revolution. Any contradiction between a
revolution which calls itself Islamic and the Arab
revolution means that that revolution is not
Islamic. As an Arab revolutionary, I understand
the matter as such. .. because a true Islamic
revolution should absorb the Arab ideology...and
remove any contradiction between it and this
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ideology.(1)
Moreover, President Hussein scoffed at those who said there
is a difference between Shi’i and Sunni, Arab and Kurd: “we
in Iraq are one united people". He added, however, that
there might be a new attempt to divide the Arab homeland.(2>
In fact, there was an unbridgeable gap between Khomeini
and all Arab nationalists. Khomeini believed that the
ultimate aim of Islam was "to abolish nationality", and
therefore Arab Nationalism was "fundamentally opposed to
Islam" because it hindered the ability of Islam to act as a
uniting force, religiously and politically.(3) To the
hardline Islamic revolutionaries in Iran, Arab Nationalism
not only in Iraq but in any other country was a negative and
obstructionist philosophy that would have to be eliminated
before the Islamic Revolution could proceed.(4) As a matter
of fact, Khomeini does not believe in Arab Nationalism and as
long as he opposes Arab Nationalism it means he wants to
fragment the Islamic community. Without any doubt this
threatens the Arab Nation.
The Ayatollah Khomeini’s attitude towards the Iraqi
leadership and the inherent conflict between Arab Nationalism
and Islamic fundamentalism now deserves attention. In France
during 1978, between his expulsion from Iraq and his return
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to Iran, Khomeini was asked to list his enemies. He replied,
■First, the Shah, then the American Satan, then Saddam
Hussein and his infidel Ba’ath Party".(5) As the source of
this quotation noted, Khomeini by 1980 had defeated the
Shah, had humiliated the Americans by seizing their embassy,
and had turned his attention to the third remaining enemy
-President Hussein and the Ba’athists- Aside from ideology,
Khomeini might have had personal reasons to harbor a grudge
against Iraq. After the Algeria Agreement of 1975, Iraq had
attempted to improve relations with the Shah, which required
clamping down on Khomeini’s activities in Najaf (Iraq) and
eventually placing him under house arrest before actually
expelling him. Sometime during the Fall of 1977, one of
Khomeini’s two sons died in an unexplained and sudden manner
in Najaf. Although Khomeini accused the Shah, one must
wonder whether Khomeini also felt bitterness against Iraq
either for the lapse of security -if indeed he believed his
son was assassinated— or for what he saw as cooperation after
1975 between the Shah and Iraq.
The stage setting for the war therefore was complete long
before the hostilities began. After Khomeini returned to
Iran, his Islamic revolution became an issue of growing
concern to Iraqi leadership and to Arab moderates throughout
the Middle East. The conflict between the two ideologies was
a war for minds, fought at least initially with the symbols
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of identification -whether ethnic, religious, or
nationalistic- that were readily available to all
participants.
THE WAR OF SEPTEMBER 22, 1980
Hostile propaganda which coincided with border clashes
and terrorist attacks against Iraqi officials further eroded
the peace between the two countries. The escalation of
terrorist attacks backed by Iran against eminent Iraqi
officials in April, 1980 was the manifestation of the Iranian
shift in tactics. This change signalled Iran’s objective of
destablizing the Ba’ath Government in Iraq. Moreover, the
political chaos and discord among the political powers in
Iran gave arise to conflicting voices in its foreign policy
toward Iraq and other Gulf states. It also worsened Iran’s
relations with its neighbors, particularly Iraq. In fact,
Khomeini’s extreme campaign against Iraq, as political
observers viewed, was "a convenient vehicle to deflect
attention away from the deteriorating domestic situation and
the fragmentation of power in Iran".(6)
On September 10, 1980, the Iraqi foreign minister. Dr.
Sa’adoun Hammadi, declared that Iranian troops had not
withdrawn from certain territories. including the Zain
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al-Qaius C 122sq. km], Maimak [110sq. km] and Saif Sa’ad
C1055q. km] regions on the Iraq-Iran border as stipulated by
the Algeria Agreement of 1975.(7) Notes of protest had been
sent to Iran’s representative in Baghdad, stating that in the
absence of a response Iraq would be forced to expel the
offending troops. Hammadi advised the Iranian Government tc
consult the agreements between the two countries, to retur
other areas affected by the treaty, and to refrain from
escalating the crisis. On September 14, however, the acting
chief of staff of the Iranian army. General Fallahi, stated
in an interview that Iran would not honor the agreement,
implying that it had been foisted upon iiis country by foreign
powers. < Ei)
Three days later the Iraqi Revolutionary Command Council
formally abrogated the Algeria Agreement, citing Iran’s
failure to return Iraqi territory and its interference in
Iraqi domestic affairs, especially in the Kurdish area (see
Appendix IX). It will be recalled that violation of one part
of the treaty would abrogate it in its entirety.(9)
Cross-border hostilities initiated by both sides had
continued with mounting intensity throughout August and
September 1980. Iraq accused Iran of using heavy artillery
to shell its border towns of Khanaqin, Mandali and
Zurbatiyah, as well as the oil installation at Naft Khanah
(see map no.8).(10) Each side accused the other of beginning
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hosti1ities.
It is worth noting that in view of: 1) Iran’s lack of
response to the Algeria Agreement as a comprehensive package
deal; 2) Iran’s insistence, as expressed by responsible
Iranian officials that the Algeria Agreement was inconsistent
with Iranian national interests; and 3) Iranian assertion, as
expressed by Iranian officials, that Iran did not consider
itself bound by the provisions of this agreement, it became
evident to the Iraqi Government that the Khomeini regime had
actually violated the elements of comprehensive settlement
embodied in the Treaty of 1975. Consequently, the Iraqi
Government believed that Iran considered the agreement to be
unilaterally terminated on its part. Therefore, Iraq
officially took the decision to abrogate the treaty.
In fact, Iraq’s decision abrogating the March 6, 1975
agreement with Iran was an ominous sign of the complete
deterioration of relations between both sides. As a matter
of fact, it was the last step that led both countries into
the war. Intense and widespread clashes along the borders
began between the two countries. It was reported on
September 18, 1980, and the following days that there was
heavy fighting along the Shatt al-Arab River.<11)
On September 22, 1980, Iraq launched air raids on ten
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Iranian airfields in many Iranian cities. Also, it announced
that Iraqi forces had entered into Iranian territory. Thus
the situation between the two countries had reached a
full-scale war. Indeed, the fierce condition of the war
appeared from the first day. Each country had bombed the
other’s vital oil installations and key economic facilities.
Moreover, Iran announced that it would not allow any merchant
ship to carry cargo to Iraqi ports.(12)
In fact, Iraq’s precise goals in launching its September
22, 1980, attack on Iran were complicated and multiple. The
Iraqis described their action as a pre-emptive and defensive
battle. From this point of view, Iraq designed the move to
put an end to Iran’s interference in Iraqi and the Arab Gulf
states’ domestic affairs by preventing Khomeini’s attempts to
export his Islamic Revolution to these countries. Iraqi
authorities also declared that Iraq’s goals were to stop
Iranian attempts to revive the Kurdish insurgency.(13)
In strategic terms, as I mentioned before, the Shatt
al—Arab River is Iraq’s only access to the Gulf. Therefore,
Iraq’s limited geopolitical location required it to take
action, particularly in response to Iran’s threat to Iraq’s
security interests in the Arab Gulf.
It is clear that the goals of Iraq’s incursion into Iran
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were a combination of the following purposes:
First, to destroy Iranian military power while the
balance of power had shifted in Iraq’s favour. . This shift
precipitated by the decimation of the Iranian revolutionary
upheaval. To take advantage of this situation the Iraqi
regime decided to launch a full-scale war. Second, Iraq’s
goal was probably to expose Iran’s military weakness and to
project Iraq as the leading power in the Gulf. By restoring
its military power in the Gulf, the Ea’ath probably believed
that this would force the regional powers such as Syria and
conservative Gulf states to recognize Iraq’s power and
influence. This point of view appeared in a declaration made
by Tareq Aziz when he declared that one of Iraq’s objectives
was “to prove in battle that Iraq is stronger than Iran and
fully capable of defeating it. And this is what Iraq has
actually achieved".(14) Similarly, Adnan Khairallah, the
Iraqi Defence Minister, pointed out that the Iraqi Army had
destroyed the "myth of Iran’s hegemony" in the Gulf
region.(15)
The third objective of Iraq’s incursion into Iran was to
protect the Iraqi borders from a long series of Iranian
military violations and to restore to Iraq its territories
near Oasi—e—Shireen and Mehran. Restoring these territories
to Iraq’s sovereignty would secure the main roads to Baghdad
from any Iranian approach to the capital. This was clearly
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reflected in a declaration by Tareq Aziz, when he stated that
among Iraq’s goals was the destruction of the Iranian
military power, which had been threatening "our homeland* for
a long time.(16) Similarly, President Saddam Hussein
maintained that one of Iraq’s objectives was to "prevent Iran
shelling Iraqi border towns, which were within range of
Iranian arti1lery”(17)
The fourth goal of Iraq’s attack on Iran was to get rid
of the Algeria Agreement of 1975, which Iraq believed had
been signed under duress. This was reflected in the Iraqi
President’s speech of September 17, 1980, when he stated that
Iraq had been under pressure to sign the agreement because of
Iran’s massive military support to the Kurdish insurgency,
which had threatend Iraq’s territorial integrity.(18)
The fifth objective was to overthrow the Khomeini regime.
The Ea’ath Government may have hoped to defeat the Iranian
regime by creating such frustration among the Iranian
military ranks that they were urged to overthrow the
clergymen regime. This was also reflected in Iraq’s
cooperation with Iranian anti—Khomeini regime groups which
have attempted to overthrow the Iranian regime.(19)
The Iraqi leadership might have been encouraged by the
following elements to launch such a limited war;
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A. The disorganization of the Iranian Army.<20)
B. International isolation which surrounded Iran during
the U.S. hostage crisis.
C. The increased tensions and fights between the Khomeini
government and the Iranian ethnic minorities such as Kurds,
Arabs and Baluchis.(21)
D. The strong relations between Iraq and the wealthy Arab
Gulf states which shared its security fears about Iran.(22)
On the other hand, Iran described Iraq’s invason as an
attempt to destroy the Iranian Islamic revolution. This was
reflected in a speech made by Mohammad Ali Rajai, tfie former
Iranian Prime Minister, before the United Nations.(23)
Irs fact, Iraq has made critical mistakes in "grand
strategy in starting a war that it did not know how to finish
and that left Iraq as vulnerable as its enemy".(24)
Moreover, Iraq’s attack on Iran on September 22, 1980,
created a situation that diverted the so called Iranian Civil
War against an outside threat.
The main result of the war was that Iraq and Iran were
exhausted financially and militarily, and drained of their
human and economic resouces. This enhanced Saudi Arabia’s
political role and gave it tremendous leverage over the other
Gulf states.
112
The war, while weakening Iraq militarily and financially,
also circumscribed its political and diplomatic options.
Consequently, Iraq’s emergent leadership in the Arab world
was substantially weakened and it became increasingly
dependent on the diplomatic and financial support of the Gulf
states. This had a profound effect on Iraq’s policy
orientation, a fact which encouraged it increasingly to Join
the Arab moderate camp.
By the same token, Iraq’s military debilitation weakened
the eastern front against Israel and had adverse effects on
the Arab-israeli balance of power. This military imbalance
redounded to Israel’s advantage and was one- of the factors
which led Israel to embark on a full-scale invasion of
Lebanon in summer 1982.
The war led to a growing naval build-up on the part of
the superpowers in the Gulf region- Fear of spill-over
effects of the war, coupled with Iran’s repeated threats to
close the strategic Strait of Hormuz, further intensified the
Western naval build-up, particularly the U.S. presence in the
region.
While leading to an increased naval build-up by the
superpowers in the Gulf region, the Iraq-Iran war nonetheless
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demonstrated the marginal leverage of both superpowers in
influencing the behaviour of the two warring countries.
In the early Summer of 1982, Iraq withdrew its forces
from all Iranian territory and declared its readiness for
peace negotiations. However, the Iraqi withdrawal did not
satisfy the Khomeini regime whoes aim was to overthrow the
Ba’ath Government in Iraq.
The Iranians have launched many attacks to cross the
Iraqi borders since June, 1982. Thousands of people were
killed or taken as prisoners of war from both sides during
these attempts. Despite the fact of heavy losses in' forces
on both sides, heavy fighting has continued through the time
of this writing. Many efforts made by the UN. the
Non-Alignment Movement, and the Islamic Conference
Organization have failed to put an end to this bloody war.
Although Iraq has declared its readiness for a cease fire and
peace negotiations, the Khomeini regime has vowed that Iran
would not cease fire until the overthrow of the Iraqi
President and the Ea’ath Government.
In summary, the fall of the Shah and the coming to power
of the Ayatollah Khomeini had unsettling effects on
Iraqi—Iranian relations. It brought into conflict a radical,
Pan-Islamic religious regime in Iran and a secular.
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nationalist regime in Iraq. Iran's commitment to the export
of its revolution abroad sharpened and complicated the
ideological clashes between the two countries, which led to a
progressive deterioration in relations. Each began lending
moral and material support to the opponents of the other, as
well as instigating distrubnces among various ethnic and
religious groups, in an attempt at destabi1ization. >
The war had fai—reaching effects on the Gulf region. As
a result, Iraq’s relations with Saudi Arabia and the other
conservative Gulf states were consolidated. The growing
tension in Arab—Iranian relations further accentuated the
clash between Arab and Persian nationalism in the Gulf, and
subsequently led Iraq to perceive its role as that of a
bulwark against Iran’s onslaught of revolutionary radicalism
in the region. Also underlying the Iraqi—Iranian conflict
was the attempt on the part of both powers to assume a
leading role in the strategic Gulf region.
The war between Iraq and Iran has had catastrophic
effects for both sides in economic, military and human terms.
Furthermore, it has had wide-ranging ramifications, regional
and global. The prolongation of this war and its potential
expansion to neighbouring countries have greatly increased
tension in the Gulf area. This haas also threatened
stability in a highly strategic region.
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The historical and cultural differences between Iraq and
Iran have influenced both countries’ perceptions of each
other. Furthermore, the Iraq-Iran relationship has been
shaped by these differences. The strategic and economic
factors as well as the existence of the holy Shi’ite' shrines
in Iraq are the basis of Persia’s ambitions to dominate Iraq.
These Shrines and the Iraqi Shi’ites have been used by Persia
as a vehicle to achieve its ambitions. To dominate Iraq,
Persia presented itself as the protector of the Shi’ites of
Iraq. However, Iran’s policy for domination over Iraq has
been a constant characteristic, since 'the establishment of
the Safawid Dynasty of Persia in the sixteenth century.
The Ottoman Empire, which cast itself in the role of the
Sunni’s defender, strongly impeded Persia’s quest to dominate
Iraq. Rivalry between the Ottomans and Persians for control
over Iraq made it a battleground for the two powers.
Ottoman—Persian rivalry had significant effects for Iraq’s
social and political stability. The development of strong
social and political institutions in Iraq was obstructed by
this rivalry. Consequently, the growth of divisive tendencies
was encouraged by both powers. These tendencies manifested
themselves in the Arab—Kurdish polarization and the
Shi’ite—Sunni division.
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Regardless of the nature of the rulers in Iraq or Iran,
their frontier disputes, especially over the Shatt al-Arab
River, mere a constant cause of conflict between the two
countries. Even when Iraq was ruled by the royal regime,
which was similar to the monarchical, conservative regime in
Iran, this similarity in their political regimes- did not
prevent the eruption of complex crises over the disputed
frontier.
Iraqi—Iranian relations were deeply impaired by the fall
of the Iraqi iTionarchy in 1958, and Iraq’s defection from the
Baghdad Pact. The Iraqi Revolution of July 14th, 1958, had
adverse effects on the Iraq-iran relationship. The emergence
of the revolutionary regime in Iraq served as a catalyst
which increased Iran’s fears of Iraq’s move toward the Arab
Nationalist revolutionary camp.
The rise to power of the Ba’ath Party in 1968 had a deep
impact on the relations between Iraq and Iran. The Ba’ath
Party injected an ideological element into Iraq’s foreign
policy orientation which shrpened the polarity between
Persian nationalism and Arab nationalism in the Gulf region.
The traditional, cultural and historical suspicions between
Arabs and Iranians were intensified by the clash between the
two nationalisms.
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The fail of the Shah and the rise of the Ayatollah
Khomeini to power in Iran marked the end of the status quo in
the Gulf region which had been created and maintained by the
Shah and the Iraqi Government since the Algeria Agreement of
1975. Because of Khomeini’s ideological principles, he
attempted to destroy this status quo and replace it with a
new political order. Consequently, the coming of the
Ayatollah Khomeini to power signalled a. sharp return of the
tensions and confrontations in the Iraq—Iran relationship.
The emergence of the Islamic Republic in Iran inserted a new
ideological dimension to the area, putting a universalist
religious regime in Iran against a nationalist, socialist and
secular regime in Iraq. Intensifying the ideological clash
between both r^egimes was Khomeini’s belief that the Iranian
Revolution was a forerunner of the world revolution. As a
result of his belief, efforts have been made to export the
Khomeini Revolution beyond Iran, especially to Iraq and other
Arab Gulf countries.
Following the Iranian Revolution, the role of both Iraq
and Iran in the Gulf region was reversed. Iraq had been
described by Iran and the conservative Arab Gulf states as a
revolutionary, anti—status quo power in the Gulf in 1970s.
However, the Iranian revolution served as the catalyst that
accelerated the solidarity and collaboration between Iraq and
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the conservative Gulf states, such as Saudi Arabia and
Kuwait. Since the Shah’s fall, the conservative states saw
Iraq as a defender of the status quo in the region against
the Iranian radical regime.
Hostility between Iraq and Iran reached its highest point
when the war brokeout in September, 1980. Misperceptions ancf
miscalculations were made by both countries. Each country
misunderstood the internal dynamics of the other, and both
over estimated each other’s vulnerabilities. In return,
these misperceptions influenced each side’s calculations.
For example, Iran’s expectations of the Shi’ite uprising in
Iraq did not take place when the war started. On the other
hand, Iraq’s expectation of a mass nationalist uprising by
the Arabs in i'ihu^istan (Arabistan) did not materialize when
Iraq invaded Iran in 1980.
Having expected a quick victory, Iraq was unprepared for
the Iranian ability to regroup and for the war of attrition
that followed. This was another grave miscalcu1ation, for
there were no internal constraints on the time horizon of the
Iranian government. It two potentially disaffected groups -
a growing number of unemployed and the military, which had
sustained several purges since Khomeini’s return to Iran -
could be kept preoccupied by the war, it was to the advantage
of the new Iranian leaders to prolong the fighting.
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Moreover, the Iranians had a stiff resolve to resist the
invasion at almost any human cost. Many factors contributed
to this phenomenon, among which were that Persians and Arabs
were historically antipathetic to each other; that the
Iranians were fighting on their own soil; and that the
Revolutionary Guards and the regular military eventually were
able to coordinate their efforts.
Iraq’s sense of geopolitical vulnerability was
intensified by the war. When the Shatt al—Arab waterway was
closed, this virtually rendered Iraq as a landlocked state
and put it under the mercy of neighbouring countries for
access to the sea. Therefore, Iraq will continue to insist
on unlimited access to the Shat ai—Arab as a vital navicsable
waterway to the sea. This sensitive vulnerabi1ity has
strategic and security implications for Iraq. Moreover, it
will unquestionably influence Iraq’s behaviour in the Gulf
region.
This war is complicated and costly and has caused
intensive devastation for both countries! Neitlier Iraq nor
Iran is capable of a clear military victory. The war has
vividly demonstrated the reality that a. military solution is
not a practical choice for settling the Iraqi-Iranian
dispute. Any solution will have to be political.
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Many attempts have been made to prevent further
escalation of the conflict. Many countries, regional and
international organizations have attempted to mediate in this
conflict and to put an end to the war. However, all these
mediation attempts have come to no avail through the present
time. The Ayatollah Khomeini insisted that Iran’s conditions
for negotiating an end to the uiar is the overthrow of
President Saddam Hussein and the Ea’thists. In effect, the
following complicated factors have turned the conflict to a
bitter level, such as:
1) Iran’s refusal of all peaceful offers to negotiate an end
to the war;
2) Its view of the conflict as a struggle between the forces
of good and evil;
3) Its rigid doctrinaire posture; and
4) Its perception of the war as a zero-sum game in which Iran
seeks to impose total defeat on Iraq.
Consequently, all these complicated factors are not
conducive to any political accommodation or compromise. Due
to Khomeini’s adamant insistence on toppling President
Hussein and the Ba’ath regime, an escalation might widen the
zone of the conflict, particularly when Iraq repeated its
threats to strike at Iranian oil installations in the Kharq
Island if Iran does not show any readiness to end the war.
In return, Iran threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz and
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attack the oil installations in the small Arab Gulf states if
the Iraqis do so. This portend further escalated the war to
a dangerous level which might drag other Gulf states into the
Iraqi-lranian conflict and invite superpower intervention
into a highly sensitive region.
For both Iraq and Iran it is difficult either to
capitulate or to compromise because of the ideological
premises of the ruling elites and because of the social and
political implications of the war. The idealism, rhetoric,
and philosophy of both regimes have not only inhibited
negotiations but also polarized a dispute that might
otherwhise have been more amenable to settlement. Neither
President Hussein and the Ea’ath Party nor Kliomeini and the
Islamic republicans could readily negotiate their own demise
or easily abandon the principles for which they fought
because of the eve*—growing need to Justify the sacrifices
made in the war.
Another cause of frustration was that Iraqi leadership
believed all key decisions in Iranian domestic and foreign
affairs were made or heavily influenced by Khomeini himself.
Iraq did not expect him to compromise his extreme Islamic
conservative stance, or his distrust of Arab nationalism in
general and of Iraqi Ea’athists in particular.
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Moreover, the different geopolitical perception of both
countries, and their rivalry to assume a superior role in the
Gulf region, will continue to be a source of tensions and
hostilities between them for many years in the future.
Therefore, the war of September, 1980 is another phase in the
continuing historical enmity between the two neighbouring
countries.
However, because of their geographical contiguity, as
well as their location in a strategic oil region, and to
prevent superpower intervention, the two countries must reach
some arrangements of settlement in order to handle and
resolve their conflict peacefully. In addition, the grim
consequences of the war and the long-term interests of both
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should abandon its unrealistic effort to overthrow President
Hussein and the Ea’ath Government. The Iranian regime should
also abandon its hostile attitude towards the Arabs in the
Gulf region and prove that it is really different from the
Shah’s regime.
If Iraq and Iran do not reach a final and durable
solution to their differences in order to make peace, their
conflict will be a continual aspect of their relations and
the basic source of tensions, hostilities and instability in
the Gulf area for a long time to come.
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/M^F»EZlNJO I X I
TREATY OF ERZERUM OF MAY 31st, 18A7
ARTICLE 1
THE TWO MUSSULMAN POWERS waive the totality of their
existing pecuniary claims on one another, provided always
that nothing in this arrangement shall affect the provisions
made for the settlement of the claims to which Article 4
relates.
ARTICLE 2
The Persian Government undertakes to cede to the Ottoman
Government all the low!ands—that is to say, the land in the
western part of the province of Zohab; and the Ottoman
Government undertakes to cede to the Persian Government the
eastern-that is to say, all the mountains—part of the said
province, including the Kirind Valley.
The Persian Government abandons all claim to the city and
province of Suleimani, and formally undertakes not to
interfere with or infringe the sovereign rights of the
Ottoman Government over the said province.
The Ottoman Government formally recognizes the
unrestricted sovereignty of the Persian Government over the
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city and port of Muhammara, the Island of Khizr, the
anchorage. and the land on the eastern bank-that is to say.
the left bank-of the Shatt al-Arab, which are in the
possession of the tribes, recognized as belonging to Persia.
Further, Persian vessels shall have the right to navigate
freely without let or hindrance on the Shatt al—Arab from the
mouth of the same to the point of contact of the frontiers of
the two Parties.
ARTICLE 3
The two Contracting Parties, having by the present Treaty
waived their other territorial claims, undertake forthwith to
appoint commissioners and engineers as their respective
representatives for the purpose of determining the frontiers
between the two States in conformity with the preceding
article.
ARTICLE 4
Both Parties are agreed as to the appointment forthwith,
by both Parties, of commissioners for the purpose of
adjudicating and making a fair settlement in all cases of
damage suffered by either Party since the acceptance of the
friendly proposals drawn up and communicated by the two
Mediating Great Powers in the month of Jemaziyyu-1—evvel,
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1261, together with all questions of pasturage dues since the
year in which the arrears in the payment of the latter began.
ARTICLE 5
The Ottoman Government undertakes that the fugitive
Persian Princes shall reside at Brussa, and shall not be
permitted to leave that place or maintain secret relations
with Persia. The two High Contracting Powers further
undertake that all the other refugees shall be handed over in
conformity with the earlier Treaty of Erzerum.
ARTICLE 6
Persian merchants shall pay the customs dues on their
goods, in kind or in cash, according to the current present
value of such goods, in the manner specified in the article
relating to trade in the Treaty of Erzerum concluded in
1238*. No additional charge whatsoever shall be levied over




The Ottoman Government undertakes to accord the requisite
privileges to enable Persian pilgrims, in accordance with the
former treaties, to visit the Holy Places in the Ottoman
dominions in complete■safety and without vexatious treatment
of any kind. Further, the Ottoman Government, being desirous
of strengthening and consolidating the bonds of friendship
and concord which should subsist between the two Mussulman
Powers and between their respective subjects, undertakes to
adopt such measures as may be most appropriate to ensure the
participation, not only of Persian pilgrims, but of all other
Persian subjects, in all the said privileges in the Ottoman
dominions, in such manner as to protect them from any sort of
injustice, molestation, or incivility, whether in respect of
their commercial activities or in any other respect.
Furthermore, the Ottoman Government undertakes to
recognize Consuls to be appointed by the Persian Government
in places in the Ottoman dominions where their presence may
be required on account of commercial interests, or for the
protection of Persian merchants and other Persian subjects,
save only in Mecca the Revered and Medina the Resplendent,
and to respect in the case of the said Consuls all the
privileges due in virtue of their official character and
accorded to consuls of other friendly Powers.
132
The Persian Government, for its part, undertakes to
accord reciprocity of treatment in every respect to Consuls
to be appointed by the Ottoman Government in place in Persia
in which the latter may consider the appointment of Consuls
to be necessary, as also to Ottoman merchants and other
Ottoman subjects visiting Persia.
ARTICLE 8
The two High Contracting Mussulman Powers undertake to
adopt and enforce the measures necessary to prevent and
punish theft and brigandage on the part of the tribes and
peoples settled on the frontier, to which end they will
quarter troops in suitable localities. They further undertake
to do their duty in respect of all forms of aggressive acts,
such as pillage, robbery, or murder, which may occur in their
respective territories.
Contested tribes over which the suzerainty is not known
shall be left free by the two High Contracting Powers to
choose once and for all and specify the localities which they
will henceforward always inhabit. Tribes over which the
suzerainty is known shall be compelled to come within the
territory of the State to which they belong.
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ARTICLE 9
All points or aticles of previous treaties, and
especially of the Treaty concluded at Erzerum in 1238, which
are not specifically amended or annulled by the present
Treaty, are hereby reaffirmed in respect of any, and all of
their provisions, as if they were reproduced in their
entirety in the present Treaty.
The two High Contracting Powers agree that, when the
texts of this Treaty have been exchanged, they will accept
and sign the same, and that the ratifications thereof shall
be exchanged within the space of two months, or earlier.
Source: Tareq Y. Ismael, *Iraq and Iran: Roots of Conflict",





EXPLANATORY NOTE RELATIVE TO CERTAIN STIPULATIONS IN
THE PROPOSED TREATY OF ERZERUM, ADDRESSED BY THE
BRITISH AND RUSSIAN AMBASSADORS AT CONSTANTINOPLE TO
THE OTTOMAN GOVERNMENT ON APRIL 26th, 1847
The undersigned, representing the Mediating Courts of Great
Britain and Russia, have had the honor to receive the identic
note, with annex, which His Excellency Ali Effendi, Minister
for Foreign Affairs, was pleased to address to them on the
lith instant, relating to the Turco—Persian negotiations.
The undersigned are highly gratified to note from the
communiction in question His Excellency’s statement, on
behalf of thes Sublime Porte, of the decision to issue
instructions forthwith to the Ottoman Plenipotentiary at
Erzerum to sign the articles of the Treaty with the Court of
Persia unamended, according to the text drawn up by the
Commissioners of the two Mediating Courts, as submitted for
the acceptance of the Governments concerned by their
plenipotentiaries at Erzerum, subject to explanations by the
representatives of the said Courts at Constantinople to the
Sublime Porte on certain points which the latter does not
consider sufficiently clear.
The points on which the Sublime Porte requires
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explanations are as follows:
1. The Sublime Porte presumes that the clause of Article
2 of the draft Treaty ceding the city, port, and anchorage
of Muhammara, and the island of Khizr, to Persia, cannot
include either the territory of the Sublime Porte comprised*
outside the city or the other ports of the Sublime Porte
situate in these parts. '
The Sublime Porte is also concerned to know whether,
under the terms of another part of the same article relating
to tribes which, while actually belonging to Persia, may
happen to be divided, one half being settled in Ottoman
territory and the other half in Persian territory, it follows
that those parts of the tribes which are in Turkey will also
become subject to Persia, and the territory in their
possession will accordingly also be ceded to Persia; and
whether Persia will ever be entitled at some future date to
dispute with the Porte the right to the possession of such
territory.
2. The Sublime Porte is concerned to know whether, under
the existing terms of Article 1 and 4, the Persian Government
*The word "situate* (situees) is used instead of "comprised*
(comprises) in the extract communicated to the Persian Envoy
in January, 1848.
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is entitled to include the pecuniary compensations as between
the two governments which it had entirely renounced, in the
category of individual claims. The Porte understands these
claims to apply solely to certain pasturage dues and to
losses incurred by the respective subjects of the two
Governments as a result of the activities of brigands and the
i i ke.
The Sublime Porte further asks whether the Persian
Government’s assent will be obtained on the question of
fortifications added to Article 2, as also in respect of the
passages regarding reciprocity which were omitted in Article
7 of the Commissioner’s draft.
The undersigned Representatives, being anxious and bound
to dispel the uncertainties of the Sublime Porte on all the
above questions, hereby declare as follows:
Ad 1. The anchorage of Muhammara is the part
situated opposite the city of muhammara in the
Haffar Canal, and this definition is not
susceptible of any other interpretation.
The undersigned Representatives are further
in agreement with the Ottoman Minister in the view,
that, inceding to Persia in the region in question
the city, port and anchorage of Muhammara and the
island of Khizr, the Sublime Porte is not ceding
any other territory or any other ports there may be
in this region.
The undersigned Representatives further
declare that Persia will not be entitled on any
pretext whatsoever to put forward claims in regard
to the region situate on the right bank of the
Shaft—al—Arab, or to the territory on the left bank
belonging to Turkey, even where Persian tribes or
parts of such tribes are established on the said
bank or in the said territory.
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Ad 2. As regards the sublime porte’s
apprehension that Articles 1 and 4 of the draft
Treaty may be irregularly interpreted in such a way
as to give rise to the revival by the Persian
Government of the Pecuniary claims as between the
two Governments, the undersigned Representatives
hereby declare that, inasmuch as it is explicitly
stipulated in Articles 1 and 4 of the draft Treaty
that all claims of this kind from whatever source
are, and are to continue to be, waived, there can
be no resumption of the discussions on the matter
in any case, and that only the claims of
individuals will be entitled to satisfaction by the
two Parties respectively; and, further, that the
examination and validity of such individual claims
will be subject, as agreed, to a special commission
to be appointed ad hoc and that the decision as to
what claims are to be regarded as individual claims
will also have to be referred to this commission.
In reply to the two subsidiary questions raised at the
conclusion of His Excellency Ali Effendi’s note, the
undersigned Representatives believe that they are Justified
in stating that the Persian Government will readily agree to
the insertion in Article 7 of the clause with regard to
reciprocity of treatment to be observed by both Governments
in mutual interest of their respective subjects, pilgrims and
consular agents. As regards the question of fortifications,
they can only express their personal opinion that a
reciprocal undertaking on the part of the two Mussulman
Governments not to fortify the banks of the Shatt-al-Arab
would constitute one more guarantee of the maintenance of
peaceful relations between the two countries, well calculated
powerfully to cement the bonds of goodwill which it is the
object of the Treaty in question to establish.
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The undersigned Representatives are accordingly entirely
Prepared to support the fulfilment of the wishes of the
Sublime Porte on this point through the intermediary of their
colleagues in Tehran; and they have reason to hope that their
representations in this connection will not " be without'
effect. ’ ’ '
At the same time, the undersigned Representatives are of
Ethel opinion that the signature of the Treaty might without
inconvenience take place without waiting for the issue of the
negotiations on the special point in question, as to which
there would be no difficulty in appending subsequently an
additional clause to the Treaty.




Source: Dr. Khalid al-Izzi, THE SHATT AL-ARAE DISPUTE;
A LEGAL STUDY, (London: Third World Centre for research and
Publishing Ltd., 1981), pp.203-205.
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APPENDIX III
THE TEHRAN PROTOCOL OF DECEMBER 21st, 1911
The Persian and Ottoman Governments, inspired by a common
desire to avoid henceforuiard any subjects of controversy in
respect of their common frontiers, having instructed the
Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Turkish
Ambassador at Tehran, respectively, to establish the bases of
negotiations and the procedure to be followed for the
delimitation of the said frontiers, the undersigned, after
discussion, have agreed on the following points:
I. A Commission consisting of an equal number of delegates
of either Party shall meet as early as possible at
Constantinople.
II. The delegates of the two Governments, furnished with
all the documents and evidence in support of their claims,
shall be instructed to establish the boundary line separating
the two countries in a spirit of sincere impartiality; after
which, a technical commission shall have merely to apply the
definite delimitation on the spot, on the basis laid down by
the former commission.
III. The work of the Joint Commission, which will meet at
Constantinople, shall be based on the clauses of the treaty
known as the Treaty of Erzerum, concluded in 1847.
1A0
IV. Should the delegates of the two Parties fail to agree
on the interpretation and application of certain clauses of
that treaty, it is agreed that, at the end of a period of six
months of negotiattion, in order completely to settle the
question of the delimitation of the frontiers, all the points
on which any divergence exists shall be submitted together to
the Court of Arbitration at The Hague, in order that' the
entire question may thus be definitely settled.
V. It is understood that neither of the two Parties may
adduce the military occupation of the territories in dispute
as a legal argument.
Done in duplicate and exchanged in original between the
undersigned, acting on behalf of their Governments.





THE PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE DELIMITATION OF THE
TURCO-PERSIAN BOUNDARY SIGNED AT CONSTANTINOPLE
ON NOVEMBER 4th, 1913
The undersigned: His Excellency Sir Louis Mallet, Ambassador
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of His Britannic Majesty to
His Majesty the Sultan; His Excellency Mirza Mahmud Khan
Kajar Ahdi—Shamus Saltaneh, Ambassador Extraordinary and
plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Shah of Persia to His
Majesty the Sultan; His Excellency M. Michel de Giers,
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of His Majesty
the Emperor of- Russia to His Majesty the Sultan; His Highness
Prince Said Halim Pasha, Grand Vizier and Minister for
Foreign Affairs of the Ottomian Eiripire; have met for the
purpose of recording in the present Protocol the Agreement
concluded between their respective Governments with regard to
the Turco—Persian boundary.
They began by recapitulating the progress, up to date, of
the negotiations recently instituted among them.
The Joint Commission provided for in Article 1 of the
Protocol signed at Tehran between the Imperial Ottoman
Embassy and the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs with a
view to determining the bases for the negotiations relating
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to the delimitation of the Turco—Persian boundary held
eighteen meetings, the first on May 12th and the last on
August 9th, 1912.
On August 9th, 1912 the Imperial Russian Embassy at
Constantinople addressed to the Sublime Porte, under No.264,
a note stating that "the Imperial Government considers that
too much emphasis cannot be laid on the necessity of putting
into effect without delay the explicit stipulations of the
Treaty of Erzerum, which are tantamount to the restoration of
the status quo of 1848."
The imperial Embassy at the same time forwarded to the
Imperial Ottoman Government a memorandum showing in detail
the frontier—1ine in conformity with the stipulations of the
treaties in force.
The Imperial Ottoman Government replied to this
communication by a note dated March 18th, 1913, No.30469/47.
It stated that:
"the Sublime Porte, being anxious to comply with
the desire expressed by the Imperial Russian
Government by eliminating any cause of difference
in its cordial relations with the latter, and
wishing, further, to demonstrate to the Persian
Government its entire good faith in regard to the
dispute existing on the subject between the two
countries, has decided to accept the line mentioned
in the aforesaid note and memorandum of the
Ambassador of His Majesty the Emperor of Russia for
the delimitation of the northern part of the
Turco—Persian frontier from Serdar Bulak to Bane -
that is to say, down to the 36th parallel of
latitude."
Nevertheless, the Imperial Ottoman Government suggested a
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number of modifications in the line proposed in the
memorandum annexed to the note of the Imperial Russian
Embassy dated August 9th, 1912, No.264.
The Imperial Ottoman Government also appended to its note
"an explanatory note on the situation of the Zuhab boundaries
and the arrangement that it u'ould be able to accept in order
to reach a final and equitable understanding with the Persian
Government on that part of the frontier."
The Imperial Russian Embassy replied by a note dated March
28th, 1913, No.78. It noted the statement "by which the
Imperial Ottoman Government recognizes as a principle for the
delimitation of the Ararat—Bane section the exact sense of
Article 3 of the Treaty of 1848, known as the Treaty ,of
Erzerum, as set forth in the note of August 9th, 1912,
No.264". As regards the modifications proposed by the
Sublime Porte, the Imperial Embassy stated (with a
reservation on the question of Egri-chai) that it could not
sufficiently emphasize the necessity of making no change in
the line established in its note of August 9th, 1912.
As regards the question of Zuhab, the Imperial Russian
Embassy, while reserving the right to submit its detailed
observations concerning that frontier, expressed “its opinion
on the whole of the Ottoman draft, which does not seem to it
to guarantee sufficiently, for the future, the maintenance of
order and peace on the frontiers*.
On April 20th, 1913, the Russian and British Embassies
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addressed an identic note to His Highness Prince Said Halim
Pasha, accompanied by a memorandum summarizing their point of
view regarding the delimitation of Zuhab and the regions
situate south of the district.
This exchange of notes was followed by conversations
between their Excellencies M. de Giers an d Sir Gerard
Lowther, of the one part, and His Late Highness Mahmud
Shefket Pasha, of the other part. The result of these
conversations was recorded in an aide-memoire presented by
His Excellency the Russian Ambassador to His Highness the
Grand Vizier on June 6th, 1913, and a note from the Sublime
Porte addressed on June 26th, 1913, No.34553/95, to the
Russian Embassy, and on July 12th, 1913, to British Embassy.
On July 29th, 1913, a "declaration" was signed in London
by Sir Edward Grey and His Highness Ibrahim Hakky Pasha
concerning the demarcation of the southern boundary between
Persia and Turkey.
The Imperial Russian Embassy then proceeded to
recapitulate the principles of delimitation established in
the correspondence concerning the Turco—Persian boundary. It
addressed to the Sublime Porte a note dated August 5th, 1913,
No.166. An identic note was addressed to the Sublime Porte
by the British Embassy on the same date.
The Sublime Porte replied to these communications by
identic notes dated September 23rd, 1913, No.37063/113.
As a result of the subsequent negotiations. the four
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plenipotentiaries of Great Britain, Persia, Russia and t
Turkey, agreed on the following provisions:
I
It is agreed that the boundary between Persia and Turkey
shall be defined as follows:
The boundary in the north shall start from boundary—mark
No.XXXVII on the Turco-Russian frontier, situate close to
Serdar Bulak, on the crest between Little and Great Ararat.
It shall then drop southwards by way of the ridges, leaving
on the Persian side the valley of Dambat, Sarnvitch, and the
water system of Yarym—Kaya, which rises to the south of Mount
Ayubeg. The boundary shall then leave Eulakbashi, in Persia,
and shall continue to follow the highest ridge, the southern
extremity of which is situate at about 44 22’ longitude and
30 28’ latitude. Then, skirting the west side of the marsh
which extends to the west of Yarym—Kaya, the boundary shall
cross the Sary—Su stream, pass between the villages of
Gride—baran (Turkish) and Eazyrgan (Persian), and, ascending
to the ridge to the west of Eazyrgan, follow the watershed
formed by the Saranli, Zenduli, Gir—Kelime, Kanly—baba,
Geduki—Khasineh, and Deveji ridges.
After Deveji, the line shall cross the valley of Egri-chai
at the place to be designated by the Delimitation Commission
in confromity with the status quo, leaving the villages of
Nado and Nifto in Persia.
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The ownership of the village of Kyzyl—Kaya (Bellasor)
shall be established after an examination of the geographical
situation of the village, the western side of the watershed
in that region being allocated to Turkey, and the eastern
side to Persia.
Should the final boundary line leave outside Ottoman
territory a section of the road which passes close to
Kyzyl—kaya and connects the district of Bayazid with the
province of Van, it is understood that the Persian Government
shall give free passage over this section of the road to the
Imperial Ottoman posts and to travelers and goods, other than
military troops and convoys.
The frontier shall then ascend to the ridges forming the
watershed: Kyzyl-Ziaret Sarychimene, Dumanlu, Kara-burga, the
hill between the reservoirs of Ayey—chai (Persian) and of
Jelii—gol (Turkish), Avdal—dashi, Reshkan, the hill between
Akhurek and Tavin Bevra-begzdan, Gevri—Mahine, Khydyr—baba,
Avristan.
As regards Kotur, the Protocol of July 15th, 1880, known
as the Protocol of Gary—Kamiche, shall be applied in such a
way that the village of Kevlik shall remain in Turkey, and
the villages of Bilejik, Razi, Gharatil (Haratil), the two
Jelliks and Panamerik shall remain in Persia.
The frontier following the Mil—Omar ridge shall ascend the
mountain of Surava, and leaving Khanyga on the Turkish side,
shall pass by way of the watershed formed by the pass of
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Borush-Khuran, the mountain of Haravil, Beleko, Shinetal, t
Sardul, Gulamli, Kepper, Bergabend, Peri—Khan, Iskander,
Avene, and Kotul. The valley of Bajirga shall remain in
Turkey, and the villages of Sartyk and Sero in Persia, and
the frontier shall pass from the southern extremity of Kotur
over the ridge rising to the west of the Persian village of
Behik, and, following the peaks of Seri-Baydost, shall Join
the crest of Mount Zont.
From Mount Zont the frontier shall follow continuously the
watershed between the Persian disricts of Tergever, Desht,
and Mergever, and the Turkish sanj'ak [district 3 of Hakkiari -
that is to say, the crests of Shiveh—Shishali, Chil—Chovri,
Chel—Berdir, Kuna—Koter,Kazi—beg, Avukh, Mai—Helaneh, the
mountains to the west of Binar and Delamper? then, leaving on
the Persian side the basin emptying by way of Ushnu into the
lake of Urumiya, including the sources of the Gadyr river
known as Abiseri-gadyr (the valley of which is situated to
the south of Delamper and to the east of Mount Girdeh), it
shall reach the pass of Keleh-Shin.
To the south of Keleh-Shin the frontier shall leave on the
Persian side the reservoir of Lavene, including the valley of
Chumi—Geli (situate to the east of Zerdegel and to the
south-west of Spi-rez), and on the Turkish side the waters of
Revanduz, and shall pass by the following peaks and passes:
Siah—Kuh, Zerdeh-Gel, Boz, Barzin, Ser—shiva,
Kevi—Khoja—Ibrahim. Thence the frontier shall continue to
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follow towards the south the main chain of Kandil, leaving on >
the Persian side the basin of the affluents of Kialu on the
right side; the streams Purdanan Khydyrava and Talkhatan.
It is understood that the Turkish tribes which are in the
habit of spending the summer in the said valleys at the Gadyr
and Lavene springs shall still have the use of their pastures
under the same conditions as in the past.
Having reached the summit of Seri—Kele—kelin, the line
shall pass over Zinvi—Jasusan and the pass of Bamin, and
shall cross the Vezne river near the Purde-Berdan bridge.
The Delimitation Commission will have to decide as to the
future of the village of Shenieh, on the bases of the general
principle of the status quo.
After Purde-Berdan, the frontier shall ascend over the
chains of Foka.—baba—kur, Berde—spian, Berde—Abul—Path and the
pass of Kaniresh. It shall then follow the watershed formed
by Lagav—Ghird, Donleri, the pass of Khan—Ahmed, and the
southern extremity of Tepe—Salos. The frontier will thus
pass between the villages of Kando1 (Turkish) and
Kesh—keshiva and Mazynava (Persian), and reach the course of
the Kialu river (the little Zab).
After Joining the course of the Kialu river, the frontier
shall follow it upstream, leaving on the Persian side the
right bank (the Alani—ajem) and on the Turkish side the left
bank of the river. On reaching the month of the Khiieh-resh
river (an affluent of the Kialu on the left side), the
149
frontier shall follow the course of that river upstream, 9
leaving on the Persian side the villages of Alot, Kovero,
etc., and on the Turkish side the district Alani—Mavont. At -
the south-western extremity of Mount Balu, the frontier shall
leave the course of the Hileh-resh river, and, ascending over
the north-west extremity of the Surkew chain, extending to
the south of the Hileh-resh river, shall pass over the Surkew
ridge, leaving the districts of Siwel and Shive—Kel on the
Turkish side.
On reaching the astronomical point of Surkew almost at
latitude 35 49’, the frontier shall pass in the direction of
the village of Champai—aw, the future of which shall be
decided by the Delimitation Comndssion on the basis of the
accepted principle of the status quo. The line shall then
ascend over the chain of mountains which form the frontier
between the Persian district of Baneh and the Turkish
district of Kyzieja; Galash, Berdi-Kechel, Pusht—Hangajai ,
Du—bera, Farajai, and Spi—Kana, after which it shall reach
the pass of Now—Khuvan. Thence, still following the
watershed, the frontier shall turn southwards and then
westwards, passing by way of the summits of Vul—Guza, '
Pushti-Shehidan, Hazai—Mai, Baii-Keder, Keleh-Melaik, and
Kuhi—Koce—resha, separating the Turkish district of Teretul
from the Persian district of Merivan.
From there, the frontier shall follow the course of the ^
Khalil—Abad brook downstream as far as its confluence with
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the Chami—Kyzy1Ja, and then this last-named river upstream as
far as the mouth of its left affluent flowing from the
village of Bnava-Suta; it shall follow this Bnava—Suta brook
upstream and, by way of the passes of Keli-Naveh-Sar and
Keli—Piran, shall reach the pass of Surene, known, it
appears, by the name of Chigan (or Chakan).
The main chain of Avroman, extending in the direction
north—west/south—east, shall then form the frontier between
Persia and the Ottoman district of Shehrisor. On reaching
the peak of Kemadjar (south-east of Kala—Seim and north-west
of Sheri—Avroman>, the frontier shall continue to fellow the
main ridge as far as its ramification on the western side,
rising to the north of the valley of Dere—Vuli, leaving the
villages of Khan-Germela and Nowsud on the Persian side. For
the remainder of the frontier as far as Sirvan, the
Commission shall — by way of exception — delimit the ground,
taking into consideration such changes as may have occurred
there between the year 1848 and the year 1905.
South of Sirvan, the frontier shall begin close to the
mouth of the Chami—Zimkan, shall pass by way of the Beyzel
(Bezel) mountain, and shall descend to the Chemi-Zerishk
watercourse. Next, following the watershed between this
last-named watercourse and the river which, rising in the
Bend-Bemo, bears, according to the identic nnap, the name of
Pushti—Gherav (Arkhevendu>, it shall ascend to the summit of
Bend-Bemo.
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After fol lowing the ridge of Eamu (Bemo), the frontier, j-
on reaching the defile of Derbendi-Dehul (Derbendi-Hur),
shall follow the course of the Zengeneh (Abbasan) river as
far as the point nearest to the summit of the Shevaldir
(astronomical point) and situate below the village of
liamyshan. It shall ascend this summit and shall next pass by
way of the crests of the hills forming a watershed between
the plans of Tileku and Serkaleh, then by way of the chains
of Khuli—Baghan, Jebel-Ali-Beg, Bender—Chok—Chermik, Sengler,
and Asengueran, as far as the point in the Tengi-Hammam
defile situate opposite the northern extremity of the Karawiz
mountains.
Thence the frontier shall follow the course of the river
Kuretu as far as the village of that name. The future of the
village of Kuretu shall be decided by the Delimitation
Commission on the basis of the nationality of its
inhabitants. Thence the frontier shall pass by way of the
road between the villages of Kuretu and Kush-Kurrek, then
along the crests of Mounts Kishka and Ak—Dag, and then,
leaving Kaia—Sedzi in Persia, it shall turn southwards as far *
as the Ottoman post of Kanibez. Thence it shall follow the
course of the Elvend river upstream as far as the point a
quarter of an hour’s distance downstream from its confluence
with the Gilan watercourse; from that point it shall continue
as far as the Naft-Su, skirting the Ab-Bakhshan in accordance
with the line agreed upon with the late Mahmud Shefket Pasha
152
and shown roughly on the map annexed to the note of the
Imperial Russian Embassy dated August 5th, 1913, and leaving
Naft—Mukataasy to Turkey. Thence, the frontier-line,
following the Naft-Deressi, on reaching the point where the
Kassri Shir in road cuts that waterway, shall continue along
the mountains of Varbulend, Koherigh—Keleshuvan, and
Jebel—Gerebi (the extension of the Jebeli—Hamrinach in).
The Delimitation Commission shall draw up a special
agreement for the distribution of the Gengir (Suma.r) waters
between the parties concerned.
The part of the frontier between mendeli and the northern
point of the line indicated in the declaration made in London,
on July 29th (Shuaib) between Hakky Pasha and Sir E. Grey not
having yet been discussed in detail, the undersigned leave
the establishment of that part of the frontier to the
Delimitation Commission.
As regards delimitation from the region of Hawiseh as far
as the sea, the frontier-line shall start from the place
called Umm-Shir, where the Kho>—el-Duvel divides from the
Khor—el—Azem. Umm-Shir is situated east of the Junction of
the Khoi—el—Muhaisin with the Khor—el—Azem, nine miles
north-west of Bisaitin, a place situated at latitude 31
degrees 43’—29". From Umm-Shir, the line shall turn
south-westwards as far as the longitude 45 degrees at the
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southern extremity of a small lake known also by the name of
Azem and situate in the Khor—el-Azem some distance north-west
of Shuaib. From this point the line shall continue to the
south along the marsh as far as latitude 31 degrees, which it
shall follow directly eastwards as far as a point northeast
of Kushk-i-Easra, so as to leave this place in Ottoman
territory. From this point the line shall go southwards as
far as the Khayeen canal at a point between the Nahr—Diaiji
and the Nahr-Abu’1-Arabid; it shall follow the "medium filum
aquae” of the Khayeen canal as far as the point where the
latter Joins the Shatt al—Arab, at the mouth of the
Nahi—Nazaileh. From this point the frontier shall follow the
course of the Shatt al-Arab as far as the sea, leaving under
Ottoman sovereignty the river and ail tfie islands therein,
subject to the following conditions and exceptions;
(a) The following shall belong to Persia: (I) the Island
of Muhalla and the two islands situate between the latter and
the left bank of the Shatt al-Arab (Persian bank of Abadan);
(II) the four islands between Shetait and Maawiyeh and the
two islands opposite Mankuhi which are both dependencies of
the island of Abadan; (III) any small islands now existing or
that may be formed which are connected at low water with the
island of Abadan or with Persian “terra firma" below
Nahr—Nazaileh.
(b) The modern port and anchorage of Muhammara, above and
below the junction of the river Karun with the Shatt al-Arab,
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shall remain luithin Persian Jurisdiction in conformity with
the Treaty of Erzerum; the Ottoman right of usage of this
part of the river shall not, however, be affected thereby,
nor shall Persian jurisdiction extend to the parts of the
river outside the anchorage.
<c) No change shall be made in the existing rights, usages
and customs as regards fishing on the Persian bank of the
Shatt al—Arab, the word "bank" including also the lands
connected with the coast at low water.
<d) Ottoman Jurisdiction shall not extend over the parts
of the Persian coast that may be temporarily covered by water
at high tide or by other accidental causes. Persian
Jurisdiction, on its side, shall not be exercised over lands
that may be temporarily or accidentlly uncovered when the
water is below the normal low—water level.
(e) The Sheik of Muhammara shall continue to enjoy in
conformity with the Ottoman laws his rights of ownership in
ottoman territory.
The frontier—1ine established in the declaration is shown
in red on the map annexed hereto.
The parts of the frontier not detailed in the
above-mentioned frontier-line shall be established on the
basis of the principle of the status quo, in conformity with
the stipulations of Article 3 of the Treaty of Erzerum.
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II
The frontie>—line shall be delimited on the spot by a
Delimitation Commission, consisting of commissioners of the
four Governments.
Each Government shall be represented on this Commission by
a sioner’s place on the Commission in case of need.
Ill
The Delimitation Commission, in the performance of the
task devolving upon it, shall comply:
(1) With the provisions of the present Protocol;
(2) With the Rules of Procedure of the Delimitation
Commission annexed (Annex A) to the present Protocol.
IV
In the event of a divergence of opinion in the Commission
as to the boundary—1ine of any part of the frontier, the
Ottoman and Persian commissioners shall submit a written
statement of their respective points of view within
forty—eight hours to the Russian and British Commissioners,
who shall hold a private meeting and shall give a decision on
the questions in dispute and communicate their decision to
their Ottoman and Persian colleagues. This decision shall be
inserted in the Minutes of the plenary meeting and shall be
recognized as binding on all four Governments.
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V
As soon as part of the frontier has been delimited, such
part shall be regarded as finally fixed and shall not be
liable to subsequent examination or revision.
VI
As the work of delimitation proceeds, the Ottoman and
Persian Governments shall have the right to establish posts
on the frontier.
VII
it is understood that the concession granted by the
Convention of May 28th, 1901 by the Government of His
Imperial Majes^ty the Shah of Persia to William Knox D’Arcy
and now being worked, in conformity with the provisions of
Article 9 of the said Convention, by the Anglo—Persian Oil
Company (Limited), having its registered office at Winchester
House, London (the said Cons'ention being referred to
hereunder as "the Convention" in the Annex B to the present
Protocol), shall remain in full and unrestricted force
throughout the territories transferred by Persian to Turkey




The Ottoman and Persian Governments will distribute among
the officials on the frontier a sufficient number of copies
of the delimitation map drawn up by the Commission, together
with copies of translations of the statement provided for in
Article XV of the Commission"s Rules of Procedure. It is







Source: Ministry of Education and Information, Selection From




FRONTIER TREATY BETWEEN THE KINGDOM OF IRAQ AND
THE EMPIRE OF IRAN WITH THE ANNEXED PROTOCOL
SIGNED ON JULY 4th, 1937 IN TEHRAN
HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF IRAQ, of one part,
HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY THE SHAHINSHAH OF IRAN, of the other
part.
Sincerely desirous of consolidating the bonds of
brotherly friendship and good understanding betuieen the two
States, and in order to settle definitely the frontier
question between their two countries, have decided to
conclude the present Treaty and for this purpose have
appointed as their Plenipotentiaries:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF IRAQ;
HIS Excellency Dr. Naji Al-Asil
Minister for Foreign Affairs
HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY THE SHAHINSHAH OF IRAN;
His Excellency Enayatollah Samiy
Minister for Foreign Affairs
who, having exchanged their full power, found in good and due
form, have agreed on the following:
ARTICLE 1
The High Contracting Parties agree that the following
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documents, with the exception of the modification specified
in Article 2 of the present Treaty, are considered valid and
that They are bound to observe them;
(a) The Protocol relating to the Turko-Persian
Delimitation signed at Constantinople on November 4, 1913;
(b) The Proceedings of the Commission of Delimitation of
the Frontier of 1914.
Having regard to the provisions of this Article and with
the exception of the provisions made in the next following
Article; the boundary line between the two States is that
defined and tr-aced by the above-ment ioned Commission.
ARTICLE 2
The boundary line on reaching the furthest point of
Shoteit Island (approximately latitude 30 17’25“ North,
longitude 48 19’28"Ea5t) rejoins, in a line drawn
prependicularly to the low—water mark, the thalweg of Shatt
al—Arab and follows it as far as a point situated opposite
the existing Jetty No.1 of Abadan (approximately latitude 30
20’8.4" North, longitude 48 16’13“ East). From this point
the boundary line rejoins the line of low—water ' and follows
the tracing of the frontier as described in the Proceedings
of 1914.
ARTICLE 3
Immediately after the signature of the present treaty the
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High Contracting Parties shall appoint a Commission for the
purpose of erecting frontier pillars, the location of which
has been fixed by the Commission mentioned in paragraph (b)
of Article 1 of the present treaty and of fixing additional
pillars, which it considers useful to erect.
The composition of the Commission and the program of its
work shall be fixed by a special arrangement between the two
High Contracting Parties-
ARTICLE 4
The following provisions shall apply to the Shatt al—Arab
from the point where the land frontier of the two States
descends into the said river as far as the open sea:
(a) The Shatt al—Arab shall remain open to merchant ships
of all countries equally. All dues levied shall be in the
nature of payment for services rendered and intended solely
to cover, in an equitable manner, the expenses of maintaining
the navigability and improving the navigable channel and the
approach of the Shatt al—Arab from the seaward side, or to
meet expenditures incurred in the interest of' navigation.
The said dues shall be calculated on the basis of the
official tonnage of ships or their draught, or both together.
(b) The Shatt al-Arab shall remain open to the passage of
war ships and other vessels belonging to the two High
Contracting Parties used for non-commercial purposes.
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(c> The fact that in the Shatt al-Arab the boundary line
sometimes follows the low—water mark and sometimes the
thalweg or the "medium filum aquae" does not prejudice in any
way the two High Contracting Parties’ right of user in the
whole course of the river.
ARTICLE 5
The two High Contracting Parties, having a common interest
in the navigation of the Shatt al—Arab as defined in Article
4 of the present Treaty, undertake to conclude a convention
concerning the maintenance and improvement of the navigable
channel, dredging, pilotage, dues to be levied, sanitary
measures, measures to be taken for the prevention of
smuggling, and all other matters relating to navigation in
the Shatt al—Arab as defined in Article 4 of the present
Treaty.
ARTICLE 6
The present treaty shall be ratified and the instruments
of ratification shall be exchanged at Baghdad as soon as
possible. It shall come into force as from the day when this
exchange takes place.
In witness whereof the plenipotentiaries of the two High
Contracting Parties have signed the present Treaty.
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Done at Tehran, in Arabic, Persian and French, of which,
in case of difference, the French text shall prevail, the





At the time of proceeding to the signing of the Treaty
concerning the delimitation of the boundaries between Iraq
and Iran, the two High Contrating Parties have agreed as
follows:
I
The geographical coordinates shown approximately in
Article 2 of the above-mentioned Treaty shall be definitely
fixed by a Commission of experts composed of an equal number
of members nominated by each of the High Contracting Parties.
The geographical coordinates so determined definitely
within the limits fixed in above-mentioned Article shall be
recorded in Minutes, which after having been signed by the
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members of the above-mentioned Commission, shall be an
integral part of the Frontier Treaty.
II
The High Contracting Parties undertake to conclude the
convention mentioned in Article 5 of the Treaty in the course
of one year from the entry into force of the Treaty.
If, notwithstanding the efforts exerted by them, this
convention is not concluded in the course of the year, this
period may be. extended by common agreement of the High
Contracting Parties.
The Imperial Government of Iran agrees that during the
period of one year mentioned in the first paragraph of this
article and during the extension of this period, if this
extension takes place, the Royal Government of Iraq shall
undertake on the bases now in force ail matters which are to
be dealt with by this Convention. The Royal Government of
Iraq shall, by means of biannual communications, keep the
Imperial Government of Iran informed of the works carried
out, the dues levied, the expenses incurred and of all other
measures taken.
Ill
The authorisation given by one of the High Contracting
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Parties to a war ship or other public vessel used for
non—commercial purposes belonging to a third State to enter
ports belonging to the said High Contracting Party and
situated on the Shatt al-Arab shall be regarded as having
been given by the other High Contracting Party in order that
such vessel may make use of its uiaters when passing through
the Shatt al-Arab.
Nevertheless, that High Contracting Party who has given
such an authorization must inform the other Party thereof
immediately.
IV
It is understood that subject to the rights of Iran in
Shatt ai—Arab, nothing in this Treaty prejudices the rights'
of Iraq and its obligations undertaken towards the British
Government regarding the Shatt ai-Arab in accordance with
Article 4 of the Treaty dated June 30, 1930, and paragraph 7
of its Annexure, signed on the same day.
V
The present Protocol shall be ratified at the same time as
the Treaty concerning the delimitation of the frontiers of
which it shall form, as an Annexure, an integral part. It
shall come into force at the same time as this Treaty.
The present Protocol is made in Arabic, Persian and
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French. In case of difference, the French text shall
prevai1.
Done at Tehran in duplicate, on the fourth day of July,
one thousand nine hundred and thirty seven.
(signed) NaJi Al-Asil
(signed) Samiy




ALGERIA DECLARATION OF MARCH 6th, 1975. JOINT
COMMUNIQUE BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN
During the meeting in Algeria of the Summit Conference of
the Member Countries of OPEC and on the initiative of
President Houari Boumedienne. His Majesty the Shah inshah of
Iran and H. E. Saddam Hussein, Vice Chairman of the
Revolution Command Council of Iraq, held tuio meetings and had
lengthy discussions on the subject of relations between the
two countries.
These meetings, which took place in the presence of
President Boumedienne, were marked by great frankness and a
sincere wish on both sides to reach a final and permanent
solution to all the problems existing between the two
countries.
In application of the principles of territorial integrity,
the inviolability of borders and non-interference in internal
affairs, the two contractual parties have decided:
1. To effect a definitive demarcation of their land frontiers
on the basis of the Protocol of Constantinople, 1913, and the
Proceedings of the Border Delimitation Commission of 191A.
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2. To delimit their fluvial frontiers according to the
THALWEG line.
3. Accordingly, the two parties will restore security and
mutual trust along their common boundaries, and hence will
commit themselves to exercising a strict and effective
control over their common boundaries with a view to putting a
definitive end to all acts of infiltration of a subversive
character no matter where they originate from.
4. The two parties also agreed to consider the arrangements
referred to above as integral elements of a comprehensive
solution. Hence any impairment of any of their components
shall naturally be contrary to the spirit of the Algeria
Agreement.
The two parties will remain in permanent touch with
President Boumedienne, who will offer, in case of need, the
fraternal assistance of Algeria to implement the decisions
which have been taken.
The parties have decided to reestablish traditional ties
of good neighborliness and friendship, particularly by the
elimination of all negative factors in their relations, the
continuous exchange of views on questions of mutual interest
and the development of mutual cooperation.
The two parties solemnly declare that the area should be
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kept tree from any outside interference.
The Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Iran and Iraq shall
meet in the presence of the Algerian Foreign Minister on 15
March 1975 in Tehran to fix the details of work for the Joint
Iraqi—Iranian Commission created to implement the decisions
reached above by mutual agreement.
In accordance with the wishes of both parties, Algeria
will be invited to all the meetings of the Joint Iraq—Iranian
Commission.
The Joint Commission will draw up its timetable and
work—plan so as to meet, in case of need, alternatively in
Baghdad and Tehran.
His Majesty the Shahinshah has accepted with pleasure the
invitation which has been conveyed to him, on behalf of H. E.
President Ahmed Hassan Al-Eakr, to make an official visit to
Iraq; the date of this visit will be fixed by mutual
agreement.
Furthermore, H. E. Saddam Hussein has agreed to make an
official visit to Iran on a date to be agreed between the two
parties.
His Majesty the Shahinshah and H. E. Vice President Saddam
Hussein wish to thank particularly and warmly President
Houari Boumedienne who, acting from fraternal and
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disinterested motives, has facilitated the establishment of
direct contacts between the leaders of the two countries and,
as a result, has contributed to the establishment of a new
era in relations between Iran and Iraq in the higher interest
of the future of the region concerned-
Algeria, 6 March 1975
Source: Republic of Iraq, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The




TREATY OF INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES AND GOOD
NEIGHBORLINESS BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN
WITH THE ANNEXED PROTOCOLS
SIGNED ON JUNE 13th, 1975
His Imperial Majesty the Shahinshah of Iran,
His Excellency the President of the Republic of Iraq,
Considering the sincere desire of the two Parties as
expressed in the Algeria Agreement of 6 March, 1975, to
achieve a final and lasting solution to ail the problems
pending between the two countries.
Considering^ that the two Parties have carried out the
definitive redemarcation of their land frontier on the basis
of the Constantinople Protocol of 1913 and the minutes of the
meetings of the Frontier Delimitation Commission of 1914 and
have delimited their river frontier along the Thalweg,
Considering their desire to restore security and mutual
trust throughout the length of their common frontier.
Considering the ties of geographical proximity, history,
religion, culture and civilization which bind the peoples of
Iran and Iraq,
Desirous of strengthening their bonds of friendship and
good neighborliness, expanding their economic and cultural
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relations and promoting exchanges and human relations between
their peoples on the basis of the principles of territorial
integrity, the inviolability of frontiers and
non-interference in the internal affairs of others.
Resolved to work towards the introduction of a new era of
friendly relations between Iran and Iraq based on full
respect for the national independence and sovereignty
equality of States,
Convinced that they are helping thereby to implement the
principles and to achieve the purposes and objectives of the
Charter of the United Nations,
Have decided to conclude this Treaty and have appointed as
their plenipotentiaries:
His Imperial Najesty the Shahinshah of Iran:
His Excellency Abbas Ali Khalatbary, Minister of Foreign
Affairs of Iran.
His Excellency the President of the Republic of Iraq:
His Excellency Saadoun Hammadi, Minister for Foreign
Affairs of Iraq.
Who, having exchanged their full powers, found to be in
good and due form, have agreed as follows:
ARTICLE 1
The High Contracting Parties confirm that the State land
frontier between Iraq and Iran shall be that which has been
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redemarcated on the basis of and in accordance with the
provisions of the Protocol concerning the redemarcation of
the land frontier, and the annexes thereto, attached to this
Treaty.
ARTICLE 2
The High Contracting Parties confirm that the State
frontier in the Shatt al—Arab shal 1 be that wh i ch has been
delimited on the basis of and i n accordance with the
provisions of the Protocol concerning the delimitation of the
river frontier, and the annexes thereto, attached to this
Treaty.
ARTICLE 3
The High Contracting Parties undertake to exercise a
strict and effective permanent control over the frontier in
order to put an end to any infiltration of a subversive
nature from any source, on the basis of and in accordance
with the provisions of the Protocol concerning frontier
security, and the annex thereto, attached to this Treaty.
ARTICLE 4
The High Contracting Parties confirm that the provisions
of the three Protocols, and the annexes thereto, referred to
in Articles 1, 2 and 3 above and attached to this Treaty as
an integral part thereof, shall be final and permanent. They
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shall not be infringed under any circumstances and shall
constitute the indivisible elements of an ovei—all
settlement- Accordingly, a breach of any of the components
of this ovei—all settlement shall clearly be incompatible
with the spirit of the Algeria Agreement.
ARTICLE 5
In keeping with the inviolability of the frontiers of the
two States and the strict respect for their territorial
integrity, the High Contracting Parties confirm that the
course of their land and river frontiers shall be inviolable,
permanent and final.
ARTICLE 6
1. In the event of a dispute regarding the interpv'etation
or implementation of this Treaty, the three Protocols or the
annexes thereto, any solution to such a dispute shall
strictly respect the course of the Iraqi—Iranian frontier
referred to in Articles 1 and 2 above, and shall take into
account the need to maintain security on the Iraqi-Iranian
frontier in accordance with Article 3 above.
2. Such disputes shall be resolved in the first instance
by the High Contracting Parties, by means of direct bilateral
negotiations to be held within two months after the date on
which one of the Parties so requested.
3. If no agreement is reached, the High Contracting
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Parties shall have recourse, luithin a three—month period, to
the good offices of a friendly Third State.
4. Should one of the two Parties refuse to have recourse
to good offices or should the good offices procedure fail,
the dispute shall be settled by arbitration within a period
of not more than one month after the date of such refusal or
failure.
5. Should the High Contracting Parties disagree as to the
arbitration procedure, one of the High Contracting Parties
may have recourse, within 15 days after such disagreement was
recorded, to a court of arbitration.
With a view to establishing such a court of arbitration
each of the High Contracting Paries shall, in respect of each
dispute to be resolved appoint one of its nationals as
arbitrators and the two arbitrators shall choose an umpire.
Should the High Contracting Parties fail to appoint their
arbitrators within one month after the date on which one of
the Parties received a request for arbitration from the other
Party, or should the arbitrators fail to reach agreement on
the choice of the umpire before that time-limit expires, the
High Contracting Party which requested arbitration shall be
entitled to request the President of the International Court
of Justice to appoint the arbitrators or the umpire, in
accordance with the procedures of the Permanent Court of
Arbitration.6.The decision of the court of arbitration shall be
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binding and enforceable by the High Contracting Parties.
7. The High Contracting Parties shall each defray half the
costs of arbitration.
ARTICLE 7
This Treaty, the three Protocols and the Annexes thereto,
shall be registered in accordance with Article 102 of the
Charter of the United Nations.
ARTICLE 8
This Treaty, the three Protocols and the Annexes thereto,
shall be ratified by each of the High Contracting Parties in
accordance with its domestic law.
This Treaty, the three Protocols and the annexes thereto
shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of the
instruments of ratification in Tehran.
In witness whereof the Plenipotentiaries cf the High
Contracting Parties have signed this Treaty, the three
Protocols and the Annexes thereto.
Done at Baghdad, on June 13, 1975.
(signed) (signed)
Abbas Ali Khalatbary Saadoun Hammadi
Minister for Minister for
Foreign Affairs Foreign Affairs
of Iran of Iraq
This Treaty, the three Protocols and the Annexes thereto,
were signed in the Presence of His Excellency Abdel—Aziz
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Bouteflika, Member of the Council of the Revolution and
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Algeria.
(signed)
PROTOCOL CONCERNING THE REDEMARCATION OF THE
LAND FRONTIER BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ
Pursuant to the provisions of the Algeria communique of
March 6, 1975, the two Contracting Parties have agreed as
follows;
ARTICLE 1
A. The tufo Contracting Parties affirm and recognise that the
redemarcat ion«of the State land frontier between Iran and
Iraq was a field operation performed by the mixed
Iraqi—Iranian—Algerian Committee on the basis of the
following:
1. The Constantinople Protocol of 1913 and the minutes of
the meetings of the Turco—Persian frontier;
2. The Tehran Protocol dated March 17, 1975;
3. The record of the meeting of Ministers of Foreign
Affairs, signed at Baghdad on April 20, 1975 and approving,
“inter alia”, the record of the Committee to Demarcate the
Land Frontier, signed at Tehran on March 30, 1975;
4. The record of the meeting of Ministers of Foreign
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Affairs, signed at Algeria on May 20, 1975;
5. The descriptive record of operations in the demarcation
of the land frontier between Iran and Iraq, prepared by the
Committee to Demarcate the Land Frontier and dated June 13,
1975. The record constitutes Annex 1 and is an integral part
of this Protocol;
6- Maps on the scale 1:50,000 indicating the land f5"ontier
line and the position of the old and new frontier marks. The
maps constitute Annex 2 and are an integral part of this
Protocol;
7- Record cards of the old and new frontier marks;
8. A document giving the coordinates of the frontier
marks; , ,
9. Aerial photographs of the Iraqi—Iranian frontier strip
indicating the positions of the old and new frontier marks.
E. The two Parties undertake to complete the demarcation of
the frontier between frontier marks No.14A and No.15 within
two months.
C. The two Contracting Parties shall cooperate in producing
aerial photographs of the Iranian—Iraqi land frontier with a
view to using them in plotting the frontier on maps scaled
1:25,000 indicating the position of the frontier marks. This
work shall be completed within a period not exceeding one
year taking effect May 20, 1975, and shall be without
prejudice to the entry into force of the Treaty of which this
Protocol is an integral part.
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The descriptive record relating to the land frontier and
referred to in paragraph 5 above shall be amended
accordingly.
The maps produced pursuant to the present section C shall
supersede all existing maps.
ARTICLE 2
The State land frontier between Iraq and Iran shall follow
the line indicated in the descriptive record and the maps
referred to respectively in paragraphs 5 and 6 of Article 1
above, with due regard to the provisions of section C of that
Ar tide.
ARTICLE 3
The frontier line defined in Articles 1 and 2 of this
Protocol shall also divide the air space and the subsoil
vertically.
ARTICLE 4
The two Contracting Parties shall establish a Mixed
Iraqi—Iranian Commission to settle, in a neighborly and
cooperative spirit, the status of landed property,
constructions, or technical or other installations whose
national character may be changed by the redemarcation of the
land frontier between Iraq and Iran. Such settlement shall
be by means of repurchase compensation or any other
appropriate formula, with a view to eliminating any source of
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litigation.
The Commission shall settle the status of State property
within two months. Claims concerning private property shall
submitted to it within two months. The status of this
private property shall be settled within the following three
months.
ARTICLE 5
1. A Mixed Commission composed of representatives of the
competent authorities of the two States shall be established
to inspect the frontier marks and determine their condition.
The Commission shall make this inspection annually, in
September, in accordance with a timetable which it shall
prepare beforehand within an appropriate period of time.
2. Either Contracting Panty may request the other in
writing to have the Commission carry out, at any time, an
additional inspection of the frontier marks. In the event of
such a request, the inspection shall be made within a period
not exceeding 30 days after the date of the request.
3. Whenever an inspection is made, the Mixed Commission
shall prepare the relevant repjorts and submit them under its
signature to the competent authorities of each of the two
States. The Commission may, if need be, call for the
construction of new frontier marks according to the
specifications of the existing ones, provided that the course
of the frontier line is not thereby altered. Where new
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frontier marks are constructed, the competent authorities of
the two States shall check the frontier marks and their
coordinates against the relevant maps and documents referred
to in Article 1 of this Protocol* The authorities shall then
position the frontier-marks under the supervision of the
Mixed Commission, which shall prepare a record of the
operation and submit it to the competent authorities of each
of the two States, so that it may be annexed to the documents
referred to in Article 1 of this Protocol.
4. The two Contracting Parties shall be Jointly
responsible for the maintenance of the frontier marks.
5. The Mixed Commission shall be responsible for replacing
displaced frontier marks and reconstructing destroyed or
missing marks, on the basis of the maps and documents
referred to in*Article 1 of this Protocol, taking care not to
alter the position of the marks, under any circumstances. In
such cases, the Mixed Commission shall prepare a record of
the operation and submit it to the competent authorities of
each of the two States.
6. The competent authorities of each of the two States
shall exchange information on the condition of the frontier
marks with a view to finding the best ways and means of
protecting and maintaining them.
7. The two Contracting Parties undertake to take all
necessary steps to protect the frontier marks and prosecute
individuals who have moved, damaged or destroyed them.
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ARTICLE 6
The two Contracting Parties have agreed that the
provisions of this Protocol, signed without any reservation,
shall henceforth govern any matter relating to the frontier
between Iran and Iraq. On this basis, they solemnly











Signed in the presence of His Excellency Abdel—A^riz
Eouteflika, Member of the Council of the Revolution, and
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Algeria.
(signed)
PROTOCOL CONCERNING THE DELIMITATION
OF THE RIVER FRONTIER BETWEEN
IRAN AND IRAQ
Pursuant to the decisions taken in the Algeria Communique
of March 6, 1975,
The two Contracting Parties have agreed as follows:
ARTICLE 1
The two Contracting Parties hereby declare and recognize
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that the State river frontier between Iran and Iraq in the
Shatt al-Arab has been delimited along the Thalweg by the
Mixed Iraqi—Iranian—Algerian Committee on the basis of the
following:
1. The Tehran Protocol of March 17, 1975;
2. The record of the Meeting of Ministers for Foreign
Affairs, signed at Baghdad on April 20, 1975, approving,
“inter alia", the record of the Committee to Delimit the
River F'rontier, signed on April 16, 1975 on board the Iraqi
ship “El Thawra" in the Shatt al-Arab;
3., Ccirinion hydrographic charts, which have been verified on
the spot and: corrected and on which the geographical
co-ordinates of the 1975 frontier crossing points have been
indicated; these charts have been signed by the hydrographic
experts of the Mixed Technical Commission and countersigned
by the heads of the Iranian, Iraqi and Algerian delegations
to the Committee. The said charts, listed hereafter, are
annexed to this Protocol and form an integral part thereof:
Chart No.l: Entrance to the Shatt al—Arab, No.3842, published
by the British Admiralty;
Chart No.2: Inner Bar to Kabda point. No.3843, published by
the British Admiralty;
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Chart No.3: Kabda point to Abadan, No.3844, published by the
British Admiralty;
Chart No. 4: Abadan to Jazirat Ummat Tuuiaylah, No. 3845,
Published by the British Admiralty.
ARTICLE 2
1. The frontier line in the Shaft ai--Arab shall follow the
Thalweg, i.e., the median line of the main navigable channel
at the lowest navigable level, starting from the point at
which the land frontier between Iran and Iraq enters the
Shaft al—Arab and continuing to the sea.
2. The frontier line, as defined in paragraph 1 above,
shall vary with changes brought about by natural causes in
the main navigable channel. The frontier line shall not be
affected by other changes unless the two Contracting Parties
conclude a special agreement to that effect.
3. The occuurrence of any of the changes referred to in
paragraph 2 above shall be attested Jointly by the competent
technical authorities of the two Contracting Parties.
4. Any change in the bed of the Shatt ai—Arab brought
about by natural causes which would involve a change in the
national character of the two States’ respective territories
or of landed property, constructions, or technical or other
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installations, shall not change the course of the frontier
line, uiich shall continue to follow the Thalweg in accordance
with the provisions of paragraph 1 above.
5. Unless an agreement is reached between the two
Contracting Parties concerning the transfer of the frontier
line to the new bed, the water shall be re—directed at the
Joint expense of both Parties to the bed existing in 1975 —
as marked on the four common charts listed in Article 1,
Paragraph 3, above - should one of the Parties so request
within two years after the date on which the occurrence of
the change was attested by either of the two Parties. Until
such time, both Parties shall retain their previous right of
navigation and of use over the water of the new bed.
ARTICLE 3
1. The river frontier between Iran and Iraq in the Shatt
al—Arab, as defined in Article 2 above, is represented by the
relevant line drawn on the common charts referred to in
Article 1, paragraph 3, above.
2. The two Contracting Parties have agreed to consider
that the river frontier shall end at the straight line
connecting the two banks of the Shatt al—Arab, at its mouth,
at the astronomical lowest-water mark. This straight line
has been indicated on in Article 1, paragraph 3, above.
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ARTICLE A
The frontier line as defined in Articles 1, 2 and 3 of
this Protocol shall also divide vertically the air space and
the subsoil.
ARTICLE 5
With a vieuf to eliminating any source of controversy, the
two Contracting Parties shall establish a Mixed Ira.qi-Iranian
Commission to settle, within two months, any questions
concerning the status of landed property, constructions, or
technical or other installations, the national character of
which may be affected by the delimitation of the
Irani an—Iraqi river frontier, either through repurchase or
compensation or any other suitable arrangement.
ARTICLE 6
Since the task of surveying the Shatt al—Arab has been
completed and the common hydrographic chart referred to in
Article 1, paragraph 3, above has been drawn up. the two
Contracting parties have agreed that a new survey of the
Shatt al—Arab shall be carried out Jointly, on ce every 10
years, with effect from the date of signature of this
Protocol. However, each of the two Parties shall have the
right to request new surveys, to be carried out Jointly,
before the expiry of the 10—year period.
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The tujo Contracting Parties shall each defray half the
cost of such surveys.
ARTICLE 7
1. Merchant vessels. State vessels and warships of the two
Contracting Parties shall enjoy freedotri of navigation in the
Shatt al-Arab and in any part of the navigable channels in
the territorial sea which lead to the month of the Shatt
al“Arab, irrespective of the line delimiting the territorial
sea of each of the two countries.
2. Vessels of third countries used for purposes of trade
shall enjoy freedom of navigation^ on an equal and
non-discriminatory basis, in the Shatt al-Arab in any part of
the navigable Channels in the territorial sea which lead to ♦
the mouth of the Shatt a1—Arab, irrespective of the line
delimiting the territorial seas of each of the two countries.
3. Either of the two Contracting Parties may authorize
foreign warships visiting its ports to enter the Shatt
al-Arab, provided such vessels do not belong to a country in
a state of belligerency, armed conflict or war with either of
the two Contracting Parties, and provided the other Party is
so notified no less than 72 hours in advance.
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4. The tuiG Contracting Parties shall in every case retain
from authorizing the entry to the Shatt ai—Arab of merchant
vessels belonging to a country in a state of belligerency,
armed conflict or war with either of the two parties.
ARTICLE 8
1. Rules governing navigation in the Shatt al—Arab shall
be drawn up by a mixed Iran ian-Iraqi Corrimission, in
accordance withsthe principle of equal rights of navigation
for both States.
2. The two Cofitract ing Psirties shall establish a
Commission to draw up ruies governing the prevention and
coTitT'ol of pollution in the Shatt ai-Arab.
3. The two Contracting Parties undertake to conclude
subsequeTit agreements on the questions referred to in
paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article,
ARTICLE 9
The two Contracting Parties recognize that the Shatt
al—Arab is primarily an internatlonal waterway, and undertake
to refrain from any operation that might hinder navigation in
the Shatt al—Arab or in any part of those navigable channels
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in the territorial sea of either of the tuio countries that













Signed in the presence of His Excellency Abdel-Aziz
Eouteflika, Member of the Council Revolution and Minister for
Foreign Affairs of Algeria.
(signed)
PROTOCOL CONCERNING SECURITY ON THE
FRONTIER BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ
In accordance with the decisions contained in the Algeria
Agreement of March 6, 1975,
Anxious to re-establish mutual security and trust
throughout the length of their common frontier.
Resolved to exercise strict and effective control over
that frontier in order to put an end to any infiltration of a
subversive nature, and, to that end, to establish close
cooperation between themselves and to prevent any
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infiltration or illegal movement across their common frontier
for the purpose of causing subversion, insubordination or
rebel 1 ion,
Referring to the Tehran Protocol of March 15, 1975, the
record of the irieetirig of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, signed
in Baghdad on April 20, 1975, and the record of the meeting
of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Signed in Algeria on May 20,
1975,
The tu»a Contiracting Parties have agreed as folloais:
ARTICLE 1
1. The tufo Contracting Parties shall exchange information
on any movementfby subversive elements which may attempt 'to
infiltrate one ef the two countries with a view to committing
acts of subversion, insubordination or rebellion.
2. The two Contracting F'arties shall take the necessary
steps with regard to the movements of the elements referred
to in paragraph 1 above.
They shall inform each other immediately of the identity
of such persons, on the understanding that they shall do
their utmost to prevent those persons from committing acts of
subversion.
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The same steps shall be taken with regard to any persons
who may assemble within the territory of one of the two
Contracting Parties with the intention of committing acts of
subversion or sabotage in the territory of the other Party.
ARTICLE 2
The many forms of cooperation established between the
competent authorities of the two Contracting Parties relating
to the closing of frontiers to prevent infiltration by
subversive elements shall be instituted by the frontier
authorities of the two countries, and shall be pursued up to
the highest levels in the Ministries of Defense, Foreign
Affairs and the Interior of each of the two Parties.
ARTICLE 3
The infiltration points likely to be used by subversive
elements are as follows:
1. Northern frontier £one:
From the point of intersection of the Iranian, Turkish and
Iraqi frontiers to (and including) Khanaqin—Qasr—e-Shirin: 21
points.
2. Southern frontier zone:
From (but not including) Khanaqin—Qasr—e—Shirin to the end
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of the Iranian-Iraqi frontier: 17 points.
3. The above infiltration points are named in the annex.
4. The points specified above shall be supplemented by any
other infiltration point which may be discovered and will
have to be closed and controlled.
5. All frontier crossing points except those currently
controlled by the customs authorities shall be closed.
6. In the interest of promoting relations of all kinds
between the two neighboring countries, the two Contracting
Parties have agreed that, in the future, other crossing
points controlled by the customs authorities s(!all be created
by common consent.
ARTICLE 4
1. The two Contracting Parties undertake to provide the
necessary human and material resources to ensure the
effective closure and control of their frontiers, so as to
prevent any infiltration by subversive elements through the
crossing points mentioned in Article 3 above.
2. If, in the light of experience gained in this matter,
experts should decide that more effective measures must be
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taken, the corresponding procedures shall be established at
monthly meetings of the frontier authorities of the two
countries, or at meetings between those authorities, should
the need arise.
The conclusion and records of such meetings shall be
communicated to the higher authorities of each of the two
Parties. Should there be disagreement between the frontier
authorities, the heads of the administrations concerned shall
meet in either Baghdad or Tehran to reconcile the points of
view and draw up a record of the outcome of their meetings.
ARTICLE 5
1. Any subversive persons who may be arrested shall be handed
over to the competent authorities of the Party in whose
territory they were arrested and shall be subject to the
legislation in force.
2. The two Contracting Parties shall inform one another of
the measures taken against persons referred to in paragraph 1
above.
3. Should subversive persons cross the frontier in an attempt
to escape, the authorities of the other country shall be




In case of need and where the two Contracting Parties so
agree, entry to certain areas may be declared prohibited in
order to prevent subversive persons from carrying out their
intentions.
ARTICLE 7
in order to establish and promote cooperation which is
mutually beneficial to both Parties, a permanent Mixed
Committee comprising the heads of the frontier authorities
and representatives of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the
two countries shall be established and shall hold two
sessions a year (at the beginning of each of the calendar);.
At the request of one of the two Parties, however, special
meetings may be held to consider how intellectual and
material resources might be better used for the closure and
control of the frontiers and to review the effectiveness and
proper implementation of t.he basic provisions governing
cooperation as provided for in this Protocol.
ARTICLE 8
The provisions of this Protocol relating to the closure
and control of the frontier shall be without prejudice to the
provisions of specific agreements between Iran and Iraq
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concerning grazing rights and frontier commissioners.
ARTICLE 9
With a vieiti to guaranteeing the security of the common
river frontier in the Shatt al—Arab and preventing the
infiltration of subversive elements from either side, the tuio
Contracting Parties shall take such appropriate steps as the
installation of lookout posts and the detachment of patrol
boats.











Signed in the presence of His Excellency A. A. Bouteflika,
Member of the Council Revolution and Minister for Foreign
Affairs of Algeria.
(Signed)
Source: Republic of Iraq, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The
Iraqi—Iranian Conflict: Documentary Dossier, (January 1981).
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APPENDIX VIII
TEXT OF 17 SEPTEMBER 1980 IRAQI REVOLUTION COMMAND COUNCIL
DECISION ABROGATING THE 6 MARCH 1975 AGREEMENT WITH IRAN
In according with the provisions of paragraph A of
Article A2 of the Provisional Constitution and in vieu* of the
Iranian Government’s violation of the letter and spirit of
the 6 March 1975 Agreement and the attached protocols by not
honoring the good-neighbor relations, by blatantly and
purposefully interfering in Iraq’s domestic affairs and by
failing to return the usurped Iraqi territories to full Iraqi
sovereignty under the above-mentioned agreement, which shows
that Iran considers the March, 1975 agreement as null and
void, the Revolution Command Council, meeting on 17 September
1980, has decided to consider that agreement as abrogated and
to restore complete legal and effective sovereignty over
Shatt ai-Arab.
Accordingly, the Revolution Command Council has decided the
following:
1. To abrogate Law No 69 of 1976 ratifying the treaty on the
international borders and good neighborliness concluded
between the Government of the Iraqi Republic and the Iranian
Government and the three attached protocols with their
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annexes signed in Baghdad on 13 June 1975, the four attached
agreements with their annexes signed in Baghdad on 26
September 1975 and the letters and Joint minutes which were
exchanged.
2. This decision shall go into effect as of the date of its
issuance and shall be published in the official gazette. The
competent ministers shall implement it.
(signed)
Saddam Husseinchairman of the Revolution Command Council
Source: FBIS (MEA), September 18, 1980, p.E8.
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AIBBREV I AT I OlsIS
AA: antiaircraft
AAM: ail—to-air missile
AC£cW: air control and warning
ADC: army air defense control
AEW&C: airborne early warning and control
AFE: air force base




ATC: air trafic control
ATGM: antitank guided missile
ATGU: antitank guided weapon
EW: electronic warfare
FGA; fighter ground attack
GCI : ground-controlled intercept
HAWK: surface-to-air missile
IFV: infantry fighting vehicle
LAV: light armored vehicle
LCAC: air—cushioned landing craft
LSM: landing ship medium
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MAP 1
THE SHATT al ARAB AREA
Taken from Anthony H. Cordesman, "The Gulf and the Search for Strategic
Stability”. (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, inc., 1984), F.b47.
MAP #2





Taken from Ministry of Education and Information, "Selections from The Iraqi-Iranian Dispute". (Baghdad;
Government Publications, 1983).
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MAP #6: The Northern Iraq Border





MAP 8; THE LAND FRONTIER DISPUTE
Taken from Dr. Khalid al-Izzi, "The Shatt Al-Arab Dispute: A Legal Study".




Taken from Stephen R. Grummon, "The Iran-Iraq War: Islam Embattled". (New York:
Praeger Publishers, 1982), P.4.
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ARABISTAN: During the Bani Ka'ab Period
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MAP 12
THE STRATEGIC POSITION OF BAHRAIN
taken from ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN, "THE GULF AND THE SEAROH FOR STRATEGIC STABILITY





THE ARAB GULF REGION
THE THREE ARAB ISLANDS ABU MUSA.
TUNB AL-KUBRA (GREATER TUNB) AND
TUNB AL-SUGHRA (LESSER TUNB)
OCCUPIED BY IRAN IN 1971
BANDER ABBAS




















TAKEN FROM TAREQ Y. ISMAEL, "IRAQ AND IRAN; ROOTS OF CONFLICTS".




Taken from A. H. Cordesman, "The Gulf and the Search for Strategic Stability”.




Taken from A. H. Cordesman, "The Gulf and the Search for Strategic
Stability". (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984), p. 742
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MAP 16
INITIAL IRAQI ATTACK ON IRAN
SOURCE Armea forces JcxjrnsI international. 1982 p 46
Adapiea tiom wor^ by Coi W 0 SiaudenmatCf U S Army Siraiepic SiuOtes. tnstiiute
Taken from A. H. Cordesman, "The Gulf and the Search for Strategic
Stability". (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984), p.646.
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SoufKt: TItt Uillury Btitnct (London; IISS. vwlous yearj).
TAKEN FROM ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN, "THE GULF AND THE SEARCH
(BOULDER, COLORADO: WESTVIEW PRESS, 198A), PP.726-727.
1977-78 1978-79 1979-80 1980-81 1981.82 1982-83
34.76 36.37 39.3 38.25 39.67 39.1
7.9 9.94 3.79 4.2 4 2 n.a.
75.1 76.1 81.7 n.a. 112.1 n.a.
10.9 13.06 4.6 n.a. 3.7 n.a.
342,000 413,000 415,000 240.000 195.000 235.000
300.000 300.000 300.000 400.000 400.000 440.000
220,000 285.000 285,000 150.000 150,000 150,000
300,000 300,000 300,000 400,000 400.000 400,000
1,620 1,620 1,735 1,735 1.410 1.770
Chieftain Chieftain Chieftain Chieftain Chieftain
M60A1.47 M60A1.47 M60A1.47 M60A1.47 M60A1,47 M60A1.4 7
2,250 1,075 1,075 1.075 6.407 680+
BTH.M113 BTR.M113 BTR.M113 BTR.M113 BTR.M113 BTR.M113
714 782 782 1,072+ 1.065 1.265+
175.203mm 482 482 482 7
106mm.TOW 106mm,TOW 106mm.TOW lOOmm.TOW 106mm.TOW 106mm,TOW
650 1,900 1,900 1,900 7 1.800+
Hawk.SS H9wk,SS Hawk.SS Hawk.SS Hawk
401 669 715 725 665 67
332 627 650 660 600 572
AH-IJ Bell 214A Ball214A Ball 214A Ball 3I4A Bali 214A
22,000 28,000 30,000 20,000 10,000 10,000
56 48 50 52 54
3 3 3 3 3 3
4 4 4 4 4 4
24 16 17 20 14 19
1 .. — —
5 5 5 5 5 5
4 4 3 3 3 3
16 16 17 17 19 16
70 56 73 73 31 2
6 12 26 20 9 2
S.65A SH-30 SH-3D SH-3D 5H-30 0-3F
10 10 11 11 9 9
Shrike Shrike Shrike Shrike Shrike Shrike
6 6 6 6 6 -
48 28 30 36 7 23
AB-206A SH.30 AB 206 AB 206 AB 212 SH-3D
STRATEGIC STABILITY
TABLE 2 Th«Mititarv Buildup in Iraq, 1972-1983
1972-73 1973-74 1974-75 1975-76 1976-77 1977-78 1978-79 1979-80 1980-B1 1981-82 1982-83*
Total Population (millions) 9.75 10.14 10.74 11.09 11.49 11.8 12.47 12.73 13.11 13.84 13.6
Oafansa Expanditurtt
($ billions) 0.338 0.467 0803 1.19 1.41 1.66 2.02 2.67 3 0 n a. n.a.
GNP ($ billiont) 3.5 5.0 5.6 13.4 14.2 16.3 15.05 21.4 390 n.a. n.a.
DE n H o' GNP 0.65 G.4 14.33 B.B8 9.6 10.18 13.03 12.47 7.7 nM. n.a.
Total military manpower 101,800 101,800 112,500 135,000 158.000 188,000 212.000 222.000 242,250 252,250 342,250
Reserves
Army






















Medium tanks 860 990 1,390 1,200 1,200 1.350 1,700 1,700 2,600 2.800 2.300
Major types T-64.55,34 T.54,55,34 T-54.55.62 T-54.55.34 T-54.55.62 T-55.54,62 T-54,55.62 T-54.55.62 T-54.55.AMX T-54.62.72 T-54.62.72
Other armored vehicles 300 1.300 1.300 1,300 1,600 1,800 1,620 1.700 2.500 2.100 3,000
Major types AML,Ferret BTR-152 PTR.152 8TR.BMP BTR.BMP BTFI.BMP BTR.BMP BTR.BMP BTR.BMP BTR.BMP BTR.BMP
Artillery 300 700 700 790 790 790 930 930 1,040 660 878*
SP guns — — — 90 90 90 130 130 240 7 7












AA weapons — included included 800 800 800 1.200 1,200 1.200 1,200 1,200
Missiles - - FROG SSM SA.7SAM SA-7SAM 27FHOG 38FROG 38FROG SSFROG 19FROG 19FROG
N»w
Manpower 2.000 2,000 2,000 3.000 3,000 3,000 4,000 4,000 4.250 4,250 4.250
Total craft 20 30 26 29 28 31 35 49 48 50 7
Patrol 4 13 9 13 11 14 14 31 29 28 7
Sub<hasers 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 .. « «
Torpedo craft 12 12 12 13 12 12 10 40 10 10 7
Minesweepers - 2 2 2 2 2 5 5 5 8 7
Other (type) - - - - - - 3(LCT) 3(LCT» 4(LCT) 4(LCT) 3(LCTI
Air Eorce
Manpower 9,800 9,800 10,500 12.000 15.000 25.000 28.000 28.000 38,000 38,000 38,000
Total combat aircraft 189 224 278 247 299 369 339 339 332 335 335
FIghtea too 120 130 130 110 13b 115 115 115 151 151
Major types MIG-27.17 MIG-27.17 MiG-27.1? MiG-27.17 MiG*27.19 MiG-27.19 MiG-21 MtG-21 MiG-21 MiG-21 MiG 21
Fighter bombers 80 96 80 no 170 200 190 190 195 167 167
Major types Su-7. Su-7. Su-7. Su-7, Su-7B, MiG-23. MiG-23, MIG-23, MiG23. Su-20 Su20
Hunter Hunter Hunter MiG'23 Hunter So-7B Su7B Su-7B Su-78 MiG-23 MiG23
Medium-light bombers 9 8 8 7 19 14 22 22 22 17 17
Major types Tu-16 To 16 Tu-16 Tu-16 H-28.TU-16 II-28.TO-16 11-22,11-28 Tu 22.ll 28 Tu-22.fl 28 Tu-22.11-28 To-22.ll 28
Transports 33 27 28 30 45 47 45 45 56 68 58
Major types An-24,11-74 An-24.11-74 An-2.24 An-2.24 ll-14.An-24 ll-14,An.24 II-14.An-2 ii-14.An-2 11-24,26 11-24.26 )l-24.26
Helicopfers 46 69 101 101 134 135 227 237 276 366 397












Raramintary (total) 16-17.000 17-18,000 18-19.000 18-19,000 54,800 54,800 79.800 79,800 79,800 254,800 11,800
National Guard 10,000 10,000 10.000 10,000 — _ __ _ — _
Security troops 3,800 4,800 4,800 4,800 4,800 4,800 4,800 4.800 4,800 4300 4300
Other 4-5.000 4-5,000 4-5,000 4-5.000 50,000*’ 50,000** 75,000** 75.000** 75,000** 250.000 7,000
*Soma inaeeurtey may occur dua to war lomi, and toma Iranian aquipnr>ant may hava baen Source: The MiUtery Betence (London: lISS, various yearsL
takan Into sarvica.
^Paopla'l Army
TAKEN FROM ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN, "THE GULF AND THE SEARCH FOR STRATEGIC STABILITY".
(BOULDER. COT,ORAnn- ufqtvtpu WVQQ ^no/.\ nn -y/./. -»/c
